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USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1550

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CIVIL DEFENSE: TRAINING AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

In the Ukrainian SSR

Moscow VOYENNYYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 5, May 80 signed to press 8 April 80 pp 18-19

[Article by S. Golovach, senior inspector, Ukrainian SSR CD Headquarters Public Affairs Department: "Public Affairs Officer Means Organizer".

[Excerpts] "Could you write a script for a civil defense training film?"

Vladimir Vasil'yevich attentively looked at his partner in conversation, trying to guess the meaning of this question.

"I have never tried. But, if it is necessary...."

These "necessaries" had arisen many times in (Res.) Col Glazov's life. Episodes from the Great Patriotic War live in his memory.

After his discharge from the Soviet Armed Forces, Glazov went to Vinnitskaya Oblast Civil Defense Headquarters. At first, he was a course instructor and then assistant chief-of-staff for public affairs.

Many years have passed, but the veteran still does not consider himself in the reserves. As before, he is hale and hearty, sharp and energetic. At the headquarters, they respect him and value his knowledge and ability to work with people. Within the oblast, Vladimir Vasil'yevich is deservedly known as the chief organizer of civil defense public affairs. For many years, he has been a member of DOSAAF, Red Cross and Knowledge Society executive agencies and he is chief-of-staff for the Summer Lightning Military Sports Games. Recently, the Vannitskiy Obkom designated him as its part-time instructor. With his inherent talent, Glazov skillfully uses all this on behalf of patriotic military indoctrination and of spreading the word on civil defense.

The most unexpected problems frequently arise in the job of the assistant chief-of-staff for public affairs. For example, preparing this training film script. The republic was holding its first competitive showing of amateur movies on civil defense. They had received a directive to get ready. Then, the chief-of-staff asked his assistant if he would be able to write the script. He went to the film studio, got their advice and got to work. His comrades helped him. They also found the amateur movie maker who shot the training film "An Integrated Facility Exercise."

The first trial was successful. The film received a good rating at the republic showing. After this, they shot several more training films which are now widely used at the command and supervisory personnel training courses.

During his initial study of civil defense and while delving into the activities of large and small facilities, Glazov focused his attention on the fact that only the staffs were working on exercise preparations. They developed documents, set the exercise play, prepared overlays and orders and even wrote reports for support service chiefs. As far as formation personnel, employees and civilians went, they frequently did not know anything about these preparations. Was this proper? Glazov was convinced that this approach had several negative aspects. He remembered how they prepared exercises in an army environment and how they supported party political work. He suggested that exercises be preceded by a special civil defense month, that party, soviet and management activists and public organizations participate in it and that each person at a national economic facility understand his role in this job and prepare for it ahead of time.

A great deal of importance was attached to organized assistance from qualified lecturers--specialists from the CD oblast headquarters and representatives from the Knowledge Society--who visited the facilities in groups. The value of these trips was that the lecturers got acquainted with the facility status in patriotic military indoctrination and the organization of civil defense before their appearance; they conducted concrete, confidential discussions with the people and made their recommendations and expressed their desires.

Some people called this method "Glazov's cavalry charge." But, the initial experience obtained at Tul'chinskiy Rayon facilities--with the active support of party and soviet agencies--proved the feasibility of group trips. Even opponents of this method were easily convinced that there was an increase in public activity and the mass news media's role in civil defense arrangements.

Or, take the expanded socialist competition on civil defense. Everything here was too officially, and essentially formally, organized. At the beginning of the training year, the rayons and facilities adopted socialist objectives and evaluated the results in the fall. An order was prepared and the paperwork was filed. The winners did not get any non-tangible or tangible rewards. Meanwhile, several oblasts instituted Ukrainian CP Oblast Committee and Oblast Executive Committee challenge red banners which were given to the winners along with monetary awards at a public ceremony based on the year's results. Glazov went to one of these oblasts, got acquainted with the environment for socialist competition and returned with a firm intention to set up these procedures in his oblast. The party oblast committee and oblast executive committee readily supported the civil defense headquarters recommendation and established a challenge Red Banner for the best rayon in civil defense. It was awarded to Tul'chinskiy, Bershadskiy and other rayons which achieved superior results in training civilians in defense against weapons of mass destruction. The winners were reported in the press and on the radio and their experience was made available to others.

Each time we meet, Vladimir Vasil'yevich first asks what's new and where it appeared and then he talks about his activities. He personally prefers spoken public affairs work on civil defense, rightfully assuming that it provides an outstanding opportunity to conduct a frank, convincing discussion with the audience. He frequently gives lectures at facilities and he likes to hold discussions with workers on their crew or with collective farmers at the farm. He has a reputation at many schools as an experienced advisor and coach in training teams for the Summer Lightning Military Sports Games. At the Knowledge Society, Glazov is in charge of the civil defense public affairs section. He frequently helps the chiefs-of-staff and club employees prepare topical evenings, meetings with war and work veterans and question-and-answer sessions. He now has a large, reliable crew of public affairs officers in the rayon assistant chiefs-of-staff for public affairs, who are working on a voluntary basis.

In all his undertakings, Glazov constantly relies on support from the activists, expands his businesslike contacts with newspaper and radio editorial boards and enlists the services of reserve officers and generals for lectures. For a long time, the local newspapers only published articles on civil defense by staff officers. The reporters did not work on these topics. They decided to set up a meeting between reporters and staff specialists and they told them about the role and importance of civil defense and its humane nature. They cited many enthusiasts of mass defense work who deserved to be given good mention in the press. The editorial boards assigned clarification of civil defense issues to qualified newsmen--D. Levchishin of VINNITSKAYA PRAVDA, V. Bredun of KOMSOMOL'SKOYE PLEMYA and T. Bobarykin of the oblast radio station.

Glazov invited them for their first visit to a formation competition and then took them to an integrated facility exercise. Interesting articles, sketches and reports appeared in the newspapers. Good relations were established between the editorial boards and the headquarters; the editorial boards began to show a true interest in civil defense.

And, first and foremost, the lofty responsibility of a communist can be seen behind each of this indefatigible public affairs officer's words and deeds.

In Gomel'skaya Oblast

Moscow VOYENNYYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 5, May 80 signed to press 8 Apr 80 p 19

[Article: "At Lenin Collective Farm"; photos not reproduced]

[Text] Our photo correspondent, V. Gorlov, took these pictures in Gomel'skaya Oblast. The Lenin Collective Farm works under the slogan: "Outstanding Work for the Final Year of the 10th Five-Year Plan!". They are successfully fulfilling their increased socialist objectives.

The collective farm has its own Heros of Socialist Labor: veteran M. Kovaleva, a stock breeding supervisor, and T. Vasil'kova, a dairy farm employee.

The collective farmers have not forgotten civil defense. All branches of the CD civilian formations are well trained for protective operations against weapons of mass destruction.

Top photo: The livestock breeding team supervisor is at the collective farm laboratory; V. F. Syrtsova is also the commander of the livestock protection team and a member of the CPSU. Her team has 22 milkmaids who take care of 1,100 cows. From each cow, they get 3,200 liters of milk per year. Varvara Fadeyevna has been awarded the Order of Lenin and the Order of the October Revolution.

Middle photo: Collective farm aid team members in training; from left to right: T. Kir'yanova, Ye. Zheleznyak and N. Khomyakova. The aid team is in second place in the rayon.

Below: Surveillance team members at work.

Psychological Conditioning

Moscow VOYENNYYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 5, May 80 signed to press 8 Apr 80 pp 20-21

[Article by Col N. Fedenko, doctor of psychology and professor: "Psychological Conditioning"]

[Text] Recent international events have completely confirmed the conclusions of the 25th CPSU Congress that imperialism has not lost its aggressive nature. The desire to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union, a desire which was openly proclaimed by the U.S. President, is strongly reflected in the development of new weapons of mass destruction and in the modernization of those in the inventory.

If the imperialists start a new war, the employment of weapons of mass destruction will naturally have a significantly greater psychological impact on people than was the case in past years. After all, the power of strikes delivered against heartland targets in modern warfare has grown. We must take this into account and take the appropriate steps ahead of time. It should be especially emphasized that the reaction to stimuli is stronger and its consequences are more demoralizing when the individual has a low level of political maturity and has weak ties to the group. If we ignore the simple anxiety which is usually inherent in all people at a time of danger, it can change to profound terror over time. Moreover, the panicky terror of a single individual can "contaminate" the entire group, depriving it of its ability to function sensibly.

Panic may be brought about by feelings of uncertainty, defenselessness and loneliness or by insufficient knowledge of one's job and, in civil defense, by a poor mastery of protective gear and by an inability to function skillfully in a contaminated area. Panic may also be caused by improper organization of individuals and groups for future events, a long, disquieting wait and a lack of preparation for what will actually happen. A disquieting situation is also exacerbated by intentionally spread enemy rumors. It is also exacerbated by lack of organization and order, or lack of management and loss of control over people. A lack of trust among people, poor interpersonal relations and a breakdown of the group also depress the individual.

So, these are the reasons that--along with the construction of protective structures, stockpiling of individual protective gear and improving procedures and skills to control post-strike damage--it is necessary to take steps to reduce psychological casualties and maintain the psychological stability of residents and formation members whose selfless actions are able to sharply reduce, and sometimes eliminate, the damage from enemy strikes. This

package of steps includes a psychological casualty estimate, preliminary psychological training for residents and civilian formations and control of the negative psychological impact.

The psychological casualty estimate is important for establishing a system of steps to control unfavorable post-strike effects. Massive destruction, casualties and civilian psychological reactions in an imperialist-planned war can be conceived to a certain extent based on examples of the world's periodic natural disasters, major industrial accidents and disasters. For example, we have descriptions of people's reactions and behavior during the American nuclear reactor accident, during nuclear tests in Nevada, during the electrical power failure in New York and during the false alerts declared in the U.S.

What are the psychological reactions that may arise in people under extreme conditions? In this regard, we have interesting data which was published on the 10-point Richter-scale earthquake in Skoplje (Yugoslavia) where all the buildings were destroyed within 20 seconds and 1,070 of the 313,000 people were killed. The majority of the residents decided that nuclear war was underway. During the initial days after the earthquake, people were more or less in a stupor (childish and mechanical behavior, accumulating in crowds, delayed reactions, spreading rumors, etc.). They could not be enticed to work. Over 70 percent of the people had mental disorders lasting from several hours to 2-3 days.

We can arbitrarily distinguish three types of psychological reactions--slight, average and severe. As shown by special estimates, people are excited, irritable, lax and unable to concentrate during slight reactions. During average reactions lasting over 24 hours, they are apathetic and hysterical; during severe reactions, they experience a loss of contact and behave in a manner inappropriate to the situation for several days.

This description of negative reactions and their consequences acutely raises the issue of required psychological training for civilians and members of civil defense civilian formations for active operations in a difficult environment. This training is directed at molding confidence in the reliability of protective means against weapons of mass destruction, a readiness to meet the dangers in a contaminated area and stability in the face of their psychological impact. These are important components of an integrated system of measures which includes moral, special and physical preparation. This preparation is achieved on the basis of the Soviet people's moral indoctrination as intelligent, active champions of a communist victory and on the basis of developing ideological conviction and a hatred toward imperialism in them. The inculcation of these traits allows the individual to withstand the pressure of the greatest threats. This was attested to by the reaction of the residents of

Tashkent during the earthquake. The people did not lose their presence of mind for a single minute and this helped them to successfully overcome the disaster's impact.

Psychological stability is also promoted by a high level of knowledge and skill when operating in a contaminated area. An example of this was the Local Air Defense fighting men's selfless, Great Patriotic War fight against the incendiary bombs which the enemy planned to use to start fires and evoke panic among the people.

Naturally, the men of the civilian formations must be strong, adroit and hearty. Without these qualities which give them confidence in themselves, they will have a hard time coping with a difficult job in contaminated areas.

The specific subject matter of indoctrination is to achieve a situation where the psychological tension which inevitably arises in the individual in a dangerous environment will not have a depressing effect on him. For example, there is a real danger of fires, obstructions, radiation exposure, asphyxiation, etc., in a contaminated area. This situation can cause a high level of tension. But, while the untrained will not be able to control himself in these situations, the threat of danger will compel the psychologically prepared to mobilize his resources and function precisely and carefully.

During psychological training, it is very important to impart the experience of successful operations in a realistic threat environment to CD personnel and civilians. Then, the reaction to danger will gradually lose its depressing effect on people's psychology and behavior. They will acquire the ability to maintain their presence of mind and they will learn to reliably assess the situation and control their behavior in an actual threat environment.

Psychological training also involves developing an accurate idea of the destruction, fires and casualties in contemporary warfare in civil defense fighting men; they must know protective methods against weapons of mass destruction. The more complete these ideas are, the less the confusion and tension caused by actual situations.

It is especially necessary to emphasize the advisability of preparing special-purpose areas and training centers which replicate destruction, obstructions, fires and casualties. The lessons held in these areas require a high degree of experience and skill in operations charged with elements of real danger. And, therefore, they provide good psychological conditioning. An example of this is the civilian formation personnel training at the special training center in the Lithuanian SSR.

The acquisition of the necessary moral and psychological traits is also promoted by civil defense formation participation in industrial accidents and natural disaster control and mop-up operations. The high degree of physical and moral strain experienced by the men in these situations and the examples of heroism shown by them can all be considered a good school for psychological conditioning and can be considered as lessons in courage and patriotism.

There is an indisputable role in this job for systematic training drills, training sessions and integrated facility exercises. It is really necessary to strive for a situation which is as realistic as possible and which puts a high degree of stress on their physical, moral and intellectual strength.

During lessons in training classrooms, it is necessary to use all the means at your disposal to form a correct idea in the trainees of the situations which may arise in contaminated areas and of the procedures for acting in them. For this purpose, it is necessary to make wider use of documentary and training films o methods for operating in contaminated areas and filmstrips, posters and diagrams which reflect the situation and which contain the normative standards for rescue and reconstitution operations. Use is also made of protective structures, mock-ups and sound recordings which give the situation a three-dimensional impact.

The civil defense troop formation's operations in contaminated areas and rescue and reconstitution operations are, as is well known, group functions. Consequently, group cohesiveness molds psychological preparedness and stability. An exceptional role in this is played by systematic joint drills, training sessions, support service-tactical exercises and integrated facility exercises. They help people gain a better knowledge of each other and they teach mutual understanding, interaction and mutual assistance. Group cohesiveness is promoted by a correct assignment of people which considers their joint jobs and individual abilities and traits. This accelerates the process of drawing the group together and it develops mutual trust. The leading role in civil defense group and formation cohesiveness belongs to party groups, political officers and activists. They are the ideological nucleus of the group and use their authority among the people. Their influence ensures a healthy psychological atmosphere, the development of intergroup relations and the elimination of negative psychological effects. In turn, this atmosphere has a favorable effect on each member of the formation by increasing his resistance to unfavorable influences and by protecting him against them.

The enhanced effectiveness of civilians and CD civilian formations is also promoted, as already mentioned, by steps to restore the psychological stability and efficiency of people who have lived through a shock. This job is conducted by executives and [illegible] organizations in concrete situations based on an assessment of the people's state. First of all, communists, experienced

organizers and former front line soldiers must be sent to the most troubled sectors, supervisors must be designated to replace casualties and communications must be restored. Timely appeals, an explanation of the situation and its prospects and the assignment of specific missions will also have a mobilizing effect. As shown by an analysis of events during the Tashkent earthquake, the energetic, mobilizing steps taken by executives completely precluded undesirable psychological effects among the people and helped to swiftly organize highly effective rescue and reconstitution operations.

A large role in restoring civilian psychological stability is played by the personal example of executives, communists and Komsomol members and by their aggressive actions in a damage area. Good management, confidence, competence and an understanding of the prospects--all of this is perceived by the people as a sign of strength: it helps them get rid of their dispiriting thoughts and feelings. They must be convinced that the struggle continues and will be pressed to victory and that the necessary steps for this are being taken. It is especially necessary to focus attention on training people to overcome the initial confusion caused by the shock of an attack and stimulate them to take aggressive action to render first aid to the injured and to evacuate them from the damage area and to rebuild housing and industry. It should be explained to the trainees that, if several people become hysterical, it is necessary to calm them, appeal for order and demand discipline and energetic actions from them; if this does not help, it is necessary to isolate them. They must decisively stop false rumors, depressing conversations, expressions of alarm and disturbing assessments by setting them off with objective, business-like news on the situation.

As we can see, ensuring a high level of activity among CD civilian fomations under contemporary conditions involves an in-depth, comprehensive consideration and use of psychology. The implementation of the appropriate measures will guarantee the enhanced effectiveness of CD civilian formations as well as enhanced stability in facility operations.

Local Radio Broadcast Material

Moscow VOYENNYYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 5, May 80 signed to press 8 Apr 80 p 22

[Article: "Test Yourself"]

[Text] Local radio braodcasts on civil defense at national economic facilities are very popular. In this respect, the Dynamo Plant (Moscow) has gained some especially valuable experience. In

close cooperation, the facility radio station's editors and the CD headquarters regularly prepare these broadcasts for the local radio relay net in various forms (discussions, sketches, reports). In an understandable way, they spread civil defense knowledge and cover training experience and the leaders in socialist competition. They sharply criticize the deficiencies noted in the training process.

Beginning with this issue of the magazine, we will begin publishing the material transmitted over the plant radio for the Dynamo workers. We hope that this will be of interest to our readers. And, now--the first discussion.

An important training period for our work group in the civil defense curriculum is coming to a close. All the employees and civilian formation men and commanders are working in training groups. The time has come to test our knowledge and applied skills in the final lessons where the instructors will rate everybody.

It must be said that these ratings will primarily depend upon the trainees' applied skills and on their ability to skillfully and quickly meet the established standards. This is why everybody must perform 1-2 standards during the final lesson in addition to answering the instructor's questions. This is a mandatory requirement.

Our work group has many employees who receive high ratings year after year in the final lessons. For example, in equipment shop No 1, we can cite metalworker-tool maker Nikolay Ivanovich Polikarpov and metalworker-assembler Lyudmila Sergeyevna Volkhovskaya.

What is the secret of their success? These outstanding workers believe that there is no secret; it is only necessary to carefully study the material from beginning to end and train a lot on all the standards.

"How could it be otherwise!" said Nikolay Ivanovich. "After all, it is just like sports; it is necessary to train constantly. Otherwise, you will forget how to put on a gasmask, without even mentioning performance of the other standards."

The example set by civil defense activists must be followed by everybody. This especially applies to comrades who are not able to attend the lessons for various good reasons (they are attending the technikum's or institute's evening division, are burdened with childcare, etc.). Under the supervision of training group instructors, they study the curriculum on their own using the pamphlet "This is What Everybody Must Know and Be Able to Do" and other literature. Later, they take the examinations on an individual basis.

But, what do we encounter at times? These comrades have a good knowledge of the theory but their performance of the standards is not always good. For example, one young worker--a student at the tekhnikum's evening division--smartly responded to all the training group instructor's questions. But, when he asked her to perform standard No 1 (putting on the gasmask), there was confusion. The young woman put on the mask and immediately tore it off her head. Why? Was it hard to breath? It turned out that she forgot to open the hole on the bottom of the canister. This is what being absent from training sessions leads to.

To a great extent, the success of the final lessons is determined by the discipline and actions of the trainees themselves. But, in the mechanical set up shop training group, dispatcher Vladimir Belozerov showed his obvious lack of desire to attend the lessons. We can legitimately ask what "baggage" he will bring to the final lesson? While it is not too late, we would advise Comrade Belozerov to fill the gap in his knowledge which he is responsible for. He has examples to follow. For example, lathe operator and repairman Sergey Pavlovich Shchuplov. He studies conscientiously, takes an active part in all civil defense arrangements and receives an outstanding rating every year during the final lessons.

In order to demonstrate good or outstanding knowledge and firm skills in the final lesson, it is necessary for everybody to review the material on their own in the time remaining, to thoroughly train themselves to perform the standards and to watch the training films at the special showings organized by the plant CD headquarters these days. Remember, Comrades, that the knowledge and skills you acquire will soon come in handy during the integrated facility exercise. Moreover, they are needed in your daily lives.

In Moskovskaya Oblast

Moscow VOYENNYYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 5, May 80 signed to press 8 Apr 80 pp 22-23

[Article by K. Svettsov, CD chief of staff, Shchelkovskiy Mine Management: "The Miners Emerged for the Exercise"]

[Text] The collective of our dolomite mining and smelting enterprise is actively struggling to fulfill the 10th Five-Year Plan's targets ahead of time and to occupy a worthy position among the other facilities of the USSR Ministry for Ferrous Metallurgy's socialist competition.

We are not lagging behind in civil defense either. All employees have been supplied with individual protective gear. We have a training center and the shops are equipped with CD reading rooms. And, when the plan called for conducting an integrated facility

exercise, this greatly facilitated the preparations for it, preparations which began almost six months before the established deadline.

It is well known that a mining enterprise has its own special features: open pits; mines; scattered shops; processing, grinding-grating and agglomeration plants; and other sections--which are also typical of our facility to a significant extent. This is why we carefully considered all these features while developing the organizational and methods documents.

A question arose: where would be the best place to set up a full-scale area to work on CD civilian formation actions when conducting rescue and emergency reconstitution operations?

Based on the enterprise renovation plan, a village's buildings were torn down. The underground vegetable storage sites, water mains, gas mains and electrical system remained. You probably couldn't find a better place for a full-scale area. It was only necessary to simulate cave-ins where the buildings had been torn down and to modify the basements and vegetable storage sites as training protective structures. The public utility system could be used for practical training of the emergency equipment units.

Preparation of the full-scale area was included in the calendar year plan along with specific executive agents (V. Spirin, mining shop chief, V. Barchenkov, machine shop chief, and others) and deadlines. These comrades handled their assignment in an outstanding manner: they built a quality range where the civilian formations had a good opportunity to train during the preparatory period.

An appropriate simulation was also developed; during the integrated facility exercise, it made provisions for a "nuclear burst."

Another question: where and how could we shelter the mining equipment during the threat of an enemy attack and how could we guarantee a black out? After all, anybody who has seen a modern open pit mine knows that there simply isn't any way to shelter the rotary system and the powerful excavators. It was necessary to turn to experienced machine operators for advice, to D. Fedin and H. Gavnutdinov, work veterans and veterans of the Great Patriotic War. They helped the CD headquarters (it was also playing the role of exercise control staff) develop a feasible plan for sheltering the equipment in a special environment; this plan was then tested thoroughly during the exercise.

One of the main goals of an integrated facility exercise is to guarantee stable enterprise operations and swift reconstitution of damaged equipment and shops. Using specialists and production innovators, plans called for accomplishing this training goal as

follows. The enterprise had several SM-11 and SM-16 grinders-graters which were beyond their service life. This meant they could be used just for training the CD emergency reconstitution formations and for practical crew testing.

There were other, specific mining-enterprise problems which required a lot of thought while developing the integrated facility exercise plan and other organizational methods documents. Because of the scattered shops and sections, we established mobile command and control centers, especially in areas where rescue and emergency reconstitution operations would have to be conducted.

A lot of attention was focused on safety procedures. After all, a large quantity of diverse engineer equipment was brought into the exercise. Moreover, like all the CD formation personnel, the drivers and crews of the special-purpose vehicles had to work in their gas masks in the heavily simulated environment (fires, smoke, dust and an adverse radiation environment). In order to avoid injuries and other unfortunate incidents, the movement of equipment into the "damage area" was strictly regulated. During the night, especially dangerous work areas were illuminated and marked with illuminated signs without violating the blackout requirements.

Persuant to the training purposes and goals reflected in the integrated facility exercise plan, we conducted staff training sessions, a command post exercise with executives, commanders and supervisors and a support service-tactical exercise with CD civilian formations.

During the exercise preparation, I had to make numerous reports to the enterprise CD chief and to joint sessions of the party committee and the mine labor union committee. Efficient corrective action was taken immediately. In addition to mobilizing the employees to actively participate in the civil defense arrangements, the enterprise mine committee provided a lot of economic assistance to the headquarters in purchasing missing equipment and in providing the exercise area with posters and placards. Socialist competition was organized between the shops, sections, departments and CD formations for best accomplishment of the goals in the exercise plan.

While working on actions during the threat of an enemy attack, the enterprise collective first of all put the group and individual protective gear in readiness. Specifically, to shelter civilians, the protective structure in being in the residential settlement was prepared in time. In addition, during the same period, they built a fallout shelter and dug revetments to shelter the equipment. Each employee was given a gas mask--which had been fitted and tested in the gas chamber--in good time.

The CD civilian formations were brought completely up to strength, equipped and swiftly brought up to complete readiness for the forthcoming operations. A vehicle attached to one of the formations did not leave the garage due to a malfunction (this was anticipated in the exercise concept to check up on what steps would be taken in this case). The rescue group commander for whom this vehicle was intended ordered that it be repaired immediately. Metal workers S. Turitsin, V. Bashkin and A. Kruglov volunteered for this mission. Soon afterwards, it was running.

A lot that was instructive also turned up while working on operations in the damage area. Immediately after the "all clear" signal, the first into the area was the surveillance group commanded by communist A. Uzliy. Pockets of fire, obstructions, smoke.... It was a good job by the simulators. The surveillance team members had to operate in a truly adverse environment. They measured the radiation, established the locations of obstructed protective structures, posted warning signs and markers and reported their data over the radio.

When the resuce and emergency equipment formations were given their missions, their commanders already knew the difficulties they would encounter and what they would have to do. Therefore, the arrival at the sites of rescue and emergency reconstitution teams was executed in a well-organized manner. The rescue and aid team members commanded by V. Zhavoronkova functioned in a coordinated manner while rescuing the injured and giving them first aid (previously trained extras played the victims.) Each one had a card with the type of injury on it.

Part of the force was shifted to repair damaged culverts, conveyors and equipment. For example, the SM-11 and SM-16 were repaired and put into operation in approximately 24 hours. They were worked on by a 12-man emergency equipment group.

While analyzing the positive results during the critique, the exercise director--L. Gavril'chenko, acting facility CD chief--also pointed out significant shortcomings. Specifically, the platoon leaders were poorly prepared; several of them were timid at times in an adverse environment. They were timid, for example, when they were operating in an environment where, according to the situation, a strong toxic cloud was moving toward the facility. This means a lot will have to be done in this area.

It is worth mentioning an incident with aid team member T. Shichina. A plaster cast of a compound fracture of the arm had been inserted in one of the extra's empty sleeves. The young aid team member ripped the sleeve. Upon seeing the blood and the bone jutting out, she lost her head. Platoon leader L. Damanova arrived in the nick of time and helped her put the splint on the "victim's" fracture. From this incident, we concluded that it was necessary to focus more attention on moral and psychological training when training formation personnel.

In winding up the critique, the exercise director asked worker V. Gomm, a rescue team member, what the exercise had done for him?

"A great deal. It was a lesson on how we must work in a special environment."

Excavator operator K. Bolgov, a Great Patriotic War veteran, responded to the same question like this:

"The exercise situation reminded me somewhat of the difficult days in combat. I think that all of us, especially the young people, should prepare ourselves morally and psychologically to function in the most adverse environments."

We did not expect any other answer from these comrades who conscientiously carry out the duties of civil defense fighting men with a recognition of their lofty duty.

In conclusion, I would like to point out that the enterprise production plan was 102.3 percent fulfilled during the integrated facility exercise.

In Tul'skaya Oblast

Moscow VOYENNYYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 5, May 80 signed to press 8 Apr 80 p 24

[Article by K. Troitskiy, facility CD deputy chief of staff, Suvorov, Tul'skaya Oblast: "A High Priority Call"]

[Text] Due to an acute, unexpected cold snap, it turned out that there was an emergency shut off of the gas mains from the gas supply sources. This caused a fire and explosion hazard.

Under these conditions, the Suvorov Inter-rayon Gas Trust manager, I. Shamonin, as the facility CD chief, alerted the civilian formations--the gas mains unit and part of the gas emergency equipment team. Responding to the high priority call, the commanders arrived at the command and control center and received clear-cut missions from the CD chief to control the danger areas.

Some of the men immediately began to make the rounds, apartment by apartment, to inspect the gas meters and to brief residents. Others set out for the areas where obstructions had formed in the underground gas mains and where the liquified gas had to be removed immediately. Although the volume of emergency work was large, the men and commanders of the emergency equipment group accomplished it within a short deadline.

Now, the obstruction is unblocked. They conducted a pressure test and blew through a mixture of gas and air from the underground gas

main and from the domestic gas equipment. Then, the gas is turned on again--and the emergency situation was corrected. The men of the gas mains section gave their final instructions to residents on how to use gas-fed equipment with sharp fluctuations in the temperature.

During those alarming hours, intense work was also underway at the command and control center. Based on reports from the localities, Comrade Shamonin quickly made his decisions and issued clear-cut instructions while maneuvering his forces according to the evolving situation. This was a severe test of the formations' readiness and teamwork.

Skill and high moral qualities were displayed by the CD emergency equipment team leader, A. Shcheglakov; the gas mains section leader, V. Gorlov; the emergency equipment group leader, A. Shamov; section leaders, I. Salomatin and S. Gaponov; the mechanics-drivers, I. Lobov, and N. Piskunov; gas welder, G. Chekmarev; and many others.

In short, it was an efficient job during which our men conquered the elements and swiftly controlled the danger areas. The experience we gained is now being widely used during civilian formation tactical-support forces drills and exercises to improve our personnel's practical skills.

Flood Relief Work in Izhevsk

Moscow VOYENNYYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 5, May 80 signed to press 8 Apr 80 pp 24-25

[Article by V. Sandalov, Pervomayskiy Rayon CD Course Chief, Izhevsk: "During Those Alarming Days"]

[Text] On 1 May of last year, it was unusually warm and sunny in Izhevsk. It seemed like nothing would be able to darken the holiday mood. But, it turned out that an alert rang out in the city during the night of 2 May. The southern part of Pervomayskiy Rayon was flooded. The city's transportation stopped moving. The water flooded dozens of streets and numerous houses, primarily single-family, wooden structures.

The disaster crept up unnoticed. The Izh River and its tributaries swiftly overflowed and filled up the Izhevsk Reservoir. Opening the locks didn't help since the level of the Pozim' River below the dam had risen by 1.5-2 meters.

City and rayon party and soviet agencies took immediate steps. A rescue control headquarters was set up. Rescue and other CD civilian

formations equipped with cross-country vehicles and boats were alerted. They worked in two shifts. There was not a single minute to loose.

The first floor of the houses on Khutorskiy Lane were flooded. Seven families, who had not been able to get out of the flood area in time, had moved to the second story of the houses. Because of the strong current, rescue workers in conventional boats were not able to reach the victims. A powerful cross-country vehicle was sent there. Under the leadership of V. Sokolov, non-TO Pervomayskiy Rayon assistant CD chief of staff for public affairs, all the people were taken to safety.

Ingenuity and gumption in rescuing flood victims were displayed by cross-country vehicle drivers S. Kabirov and M. Obukhov. They did not leave their vehicle cabs for days. Skillfully getting their bearings in the flooded streets, they drove up to the houses, threw ladders from their vehicles to the windows, helped the adults make it to the vehicle bed and frequently carried the children in their arms. Both drivers were decorated with Life-saving Medals.

Reception centers were set up for all the people who were temporarily deprived of shelter; they were supplied with food, clothing, bedding and medical aid

It should be mentioned that the marketing and food support service formations made a very good showing. They frequently had to engage the elements themselves. For example, the areas where Stores Nos 6 and 33 are located were flooded. V. Vasil'yeva, the director, and T. Dudareva mobilized their groups to save the goods. They put them up on shelves. Then, in cross-country vehicles and boats, they brought 25 tons of provisions out of the danger zone.

Store director Z. Mukhamedzyanova efficiently organized the work of the mobile food and clothing supply centers. They supplied the necessities not only to the reception centers but also to those residents whose homes were not flooded but were cut off from the stores. Distributors-packagers L. Lukina, Ye. Zapol'skikh and S. Suslova especially distinguished themselves. They delivered their produce to the victims in a timely manner and, as information officers, they explained the situation to the victims and gave them information on the flood situation and the steps being taken.

N. Teplyakova, chief of the Pervomayskiy Rayon marketing and food support service, must be given her due. She drove out to the flood area, personally found out who needed what consumer goods and where and immediately assigned missions to her formations.

The mobile groups of information officers, the people's deputies and the street committees also functioned effectively. The groups of information officers headed by V. Sokolov, S. Khaba and A. Korobeynikov drove out to the most dangerous sectors of the flood area in cross-country vehicles, reported to the residents on the current situati and helped organize rescue operations and helped supply victims with everything they needed. The information officers could also be heard at the reception centers where people had been brought from the flooded streets.

Important areas were visited by V. Russ 'kh, the rayon deputy CD chief, by N. Til'kunov, rayon CD chief of staff and by other executives. In crises, they frequently had to participate in rescue operations themselves.

The flood control and mop up operations lasted for two weeks. Rayon residents greatly appreciated the concern of party and soviet agencies and the capable coordinated actions of the CD civilian formations.

In the City of Khmel'nitskiy

Moscow VOYENNYYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 5, May 80 signed to press 8 Apr 80 p 26

[Article by N. Vitrenko and N. Kondratenko: "During the Military Instructor's Lesson"]

[Text] In his work, (Res.) LtCol Aleksey Leont'yevich Smirnov, the military instructor at Khmel'nitskiy Middle School No 17, is guided by an unwavering standard: to conduct each lesson at a high level so the students will not only be satisfied that they have acquired a certain amount of knowledge but also with the fact that they have worked actively and creatively, strengthened their willpower and character and truly prepared themselves to defend the socialist homeland.

A. Smirnov has been teaching for 10 years. We visited his civil defense lesson when the 10th-grade students were studying the topic "Characteristics of the Casualty-Producing Effects of a Nuclear Burst, the Center of Destruction and the Zones of Radioactive Contamination." We wanted to analyze the military instructor's methods.

On the opening part of the lesson, he spent approximately 12 minutes. During this time, he formed up the students, inspected their appearance and led them into the classroom in formation. Immediately after entering, he questioned 14 people on the previously covered material. How was he able to do this in such a short period of time? He used a combined method of questioning.

Three students did the assignment at the blackboard; three of them recited it; two responded orally; two trained in putting on the gas masks; and four did a written assignment, a so-called pop quiz. The answers were graded right away during the test.

Such an organized beginning for the lesson and such a clear-cut distribution of time automatically increases discipline and promotes the development of composure and the ability to express one's ideas briefly.

A. Smirnov focuses continuing attention on the development of quick thinking and an active nature. Evidently, this is why he does not begin the main part of the lesson by talking about the casualty-producing effects of a nuclear burst but, counting on the students' knowledge, he begins it with questions: what weapon is presently considered to be the most powerful; when, where and by whom was it first used; what is its action based upon?

All the questions were asked at the same time; a minute was given to think about them. The military instructor had already written the correct answers on the reverse side of the blackboard. He uses this method frequently and successfully. Moreover, it saves time.

He sets out the new material in a logical sequence according to a definite plan--he covered the characteristics of the casualty-producing effects of a nuclear burst and of the zones of radioactive contamination together with protective methods. For example, while talking about blast, he emphasized that the basic parameters which determine its casualty-producing effect are: the overpressure of the compressed air, the high-speed thrust of the air and the overpressure effect, which depends upon the burst type and yield.

In describing blast injuries, he did not pile up statistics but rather gave an overall classification of them. He focused on the fact that blasts can cause severe psychological shock and a feeling of fear and defenselessness. However, he emphasized protective methods. In more detail, he explained that as the blast wave spreads further from the epicenter, its speed swiftly drops off and there is time to take shelter. While explaining this, the military instructor drew a diagram of the blast wave's spread on the blackboard. The students copied it down in their notebooks.

Then, he explained that protection against the blast wave is provided by shelters, dugouts, slit trenches and other structures as well as by folds in the ground--ravines, hollows, opposite slopes of hills and large forests. Incidentally, he emphasized, these shelters provide sufficiently reliable protection against the next casualty-producing effect to which we will now turn.

The military instructor did not make a direct transition to the next casualty-producing effect of a nuclear burst--the thermal radiation--rather he again asked questions: who can name it and give a brief description of it? With this procedure, he sharpened the students' attention, stimulated them to think, indirectly discovered the level of knowledge they had acquired in this area during lessons on other subjects or through the mass news media and he saved time.

A significant part of the information was correctly presented by five students. They pointed out that the thermal radiation at the time of the nuclear burst could cause various degrees of burns on unprotected people. The instructor added some information which was new to the children. He stated that the source of the thermal radiation is the luminous area of the nuclear burst, an area made up of the heated products. The active effect from thermal radiation lasts for 8-15 seconds. Not a lot of time, emphasized the military instructor, but, with the highest possible organization, discipline and skilled actions, it is possible to protect oneself both against the blast and against the thermal radiation.

The problem is somewhat more difficult with the third and fourth casualty-producing effects--initial radiation and radioactive contamination of the ground. Their effect on the human body occurs unnoticed. It is only somewhat later that radiation sickness may develop. To be noted down in the summary, the military instructor presented the concepts of ionization of a living cell's atoms and molecules, X-rays and the maximum exposure dose. Again, he concentrated his primary attention on protective methods.

During the lesson, they used diagrams prepared by the students themselves and selected scenes from the filmstrips "Radiation Attenuation Factors for Various Shelters," "Behavioral Practices in a Contaminated Area" and "Reducing Radiation Levels." In trying to reinforce the material covered, the military instructor suggested that the children make annotations for several fragments from the filmstrip "What Should You Know about Nuclear Weapons?," which was shown without any explanatory text.

The students first responded to the question: "What casualty-producing effect of a nuclear burst is shown in this frame?," and then they gave a brief description of the casualty-producing properties and protective methods. This method energizes the children and they remember the material better.

During each lesson, Aleksey Leont'yevich also pursues indoctrination goals--he uses V. I. Lenin's works on defending the socialist homeland, the proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress and L. I. Brezhnev's speeches and comments. This promotes an increase in the lesson's

ideological content, develops an understanding of imperialism's aggressive nature and inculcates a sense of readiness to defend the homeland in senior class students.

The lesson ends on an instructive note. The military instructor recalls the goal of the lesson, points out whether it was achieved or not, gives reasons for his assessment to the students, announces the next topic and assigns homework. Incidentally, the latter also merits attention. He suggests that the children collect material on the topic already covered and be prepared to answer the questions in the basic military training and civil defense textbooks. He suggests that they get acquainted with the electro-magnetic pulse phenomenon on their own. He requests that they make additional preparations for the following lesson to answer the question: What other subjects must you have a good knowledge of in order to master the material of the topic we just studied? The lesson ends with the ritual dictated by the manual.

The lesson was, in our opinion, successful; this was not an accident but rather a result of the military instructor's constant, painstaking work on his methods and, naturally, it was a result of his fluent mastery of the most important teaching techniques and his in-depth knowledge of the subject. All of this also forms the ideological, theoretical, scientific and methodological basis for a quality performance of each lesson; this is what the military instructor advocates. It was not without reason that communist Aleksey Leont'yevich Smirnov was trusted to head the city's methods association for military instructors.

Protective Measures for Children

Moscow VOYENNYYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 5, May 80 signed to press 8 Apr 80 p 28

[Article: "A Most Humane Task"]

[Text] One hour is alloted to the applied lesson on the topic "Organizing Protection for Children Against Weapons of Mass Destruction." However, considering the large volume of material, it would be advisable to allocate two hours for this topic to train personnel of pre-school facilities, children's homes and general education schools.

Materials: the GP-4u gas mask (for each trainee), children's gas mask, R-2d respirators, samples of cotton gauze bandages and cloth dustmasks for children, an individual first aid kit (AI-2), an individual anti-chemical warfare kit (IPP-8), samples of labels (badges) for children's clothing and the filmstrip "Protecting Children Against Weapons of Mass Destruction."

At the beginning of the lesson, the instructor emphasizes that the children's health, development and education are subjects of concern for all Soviet people. After all, children are our future; they will have to continue the job of their fathers and mothers.

"USSR citizens," states the Constitution, "are obligated to take care of their children's development, prepare them for socially useful work and raise them as worthy members of a socialist society." We should consider those measures stipulated in the civil defense system to protect children against weapons of mass destruction as one of the manifestations of this concern. This is the most humane and noble duty of the entire adult population and, first and foremost, of parents and employees of pre-school and school facilities.

Then, the instructor emphasizes that, upon hearing a warning of a threat of an enemy attack, parents and employees of children's facilities find out exactly where the nearest protective structure is located and acquaint older children with the rules of conduct in it. At the same time, it is necessary to acquire (obtain) gas masks for children, make cloth dust masks and cotton gauze bandages and adapt their everyday clothes to protect them against CBR substances. It is extremely important to teach children how to properly use a gas mask and improvised personal protective gear. It is necessary that they know the rules of conduct in a shelter or fallout shelter for an extended period of time. It is also necessary to prepare everything required to evacuate children to the countryside and to acquaint them (especially older children) with the civil defense warning signals and the procedures for taking action.

To protect respiratory organs, our industry produces various types of children's gas masks: the DP-6m, the DP-6, the DP-7, the PDF-d. PDF-sh. In addition, for children up to 1 1/2 years, there are children's protective chambers (the KZD-4). This was discussed in issue No 12, 1977 and No 4, 1973 of our magazine.

After acquainting the trainees with the various types of children's gas masks and their features, the instructor shows them how to select them for children, how to fit the face piece and how to put them on, especially on pre-school and young school age children.

To select the mask for any children's gas mask, the height and width of the face are measured and then the appropriate size is selected from the table. At this point, the instructor recommends as homework that they measure and determine the size of the gas mask required for their child.

Adults put gas masks on young children. The child is placed with its back towards you (a small child is placed between the knees). The mask is taken in both hands by the front and back straps and

the thumbs must be inside the chin piece. By shifting the hands, the mask is put on the child's face; the head piece is straightened out over the back of the head (the straps are tightened as required).

Then, over a 12-15 minute period, it is recommended that a training session in putting a gas mask on a child be conducted using standard No. 2 but considering the special features indicated.

After this, the instructor briefly acquaints the trainees with the respirator, the cotton gauze bandage and the children's cloth dust mask. The R-2d respirator is designed for children 7 years or older. Its design is the same as the one for the adult respirator; however, it has four sizes (0, 1, 2, 3) rather than three. The cloth dust mask is made for children 3 years old or older.

In transitioning to the next training issue, the instructor talks about the special features for using the individual aid kit (AI-2), the individual anti-chemical warfare kit (IPP-8) and the safety procedures when handling them. The liquid in the IPP-8 can be used to treat the skin of children over 7 years of age (when a toxic substance has fallen on it), while a 3 percent solution of hydrogen peroxide and water with 3 percent dry sodium hydroxide added is used for younger children.

They should also be shown how to prepare the children's everyday clothes to protect their skin. However, it is better to use synthetic capes, inpenetrable cloth ponchos, ski suits, rubber boots, overshoes, leather gloves and, for the youngest, overalls.

It is very important to teach the children how to properly use protective gear. The instructor emphasizes that it is necessary to consider their psychological and physical features and age. When training a child, it is desirable to introduce elements of a game. The lessons should be short so the children won't be exhausted. It is impermissible to shout at a child or to forcefully put on a gas mask. Young school-age children and pre-schoolers in gas masks are always under the adult's supervision.

It would be advisable to actually work on the procedures for preparing children for an evacuation or for an extended stay in a protective structure. For this purpose, it is necessary to prepare 1-2 assistants from the trainees ahead of time; they will bring samples of suitably packaged gear and a selection of children's food to the lessons.

For children under 3, it is necessary to have a stockpile of products which may not be available at the country food centers or in the protective structure. For pre-schoolers, it is recommended that their favorite toys and books be brought along. It is necessary to attach clearly written labels--with the child's last, first and middle names, home address, parent's place of work and

evacuation center--to each suitcase (rucksack) with articles and produce. Cards with this data on them must be put in the inside pockets of their clothing. It is even better to write this information on a piece of white cloth and sew it inside the overcoat or under the collar.

The trainees actually do all this during the lesson. It is important to remind them of safety measures when putting the children on all types of transportation and enroute.

In preparing for the lessons, we recommend that instructors use the materials published in VOYENNYYE ZNANIYA (Nos 10, 11, 12, 1978) and the "Civil Defense" textbook (Moscow, izdatel'stvo "SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA", 1976).

Class on Rescue Work

Moscow VOYENNYYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 5, May 80 signed to press 8 Apr 80 p 29

[Article: "Rescue Operations"]

[Text] The goal of the practical lesson on the topic "Basic Methods for Conducting Rescue Operations in Nuclear Strike Areas" is to study the volume of operations and to actually master methods of executing them. It is recommended that the lesson be conducted at a CD training post or in a full-scale training area. Moreover, it is necessary to prepare them so it will be possible to get a vivid idea of the scale of operations, provide the necessary skills for the trainees and perform the standards (11-14).

If possible, it would be useful to use the following during lesson preparations and during the lesson: the films "In a Single Formation," "Facing Danger," "Procedures and Methods for Conducting Rescue Operations" and "Tactical-Support Service Exercise for a CD Composite Detachment"; the filmstrips "Rescue and Emergency Reconstitution Operations in Nuclear Strike Areas" and "A Nuclear Strike Area"; and also the poster set.

The instructor explains what a nuclear strike area is. Its appearance depends upon the yield of the nuclear warhead used by the enemy, the type of burst (ground, air) and the size of the overpressure. This is why it is arbitrarily divided into four zones: complete, severe, average and slight destruction. The layout of the zones is influenced by the city plan and the type of buildings in it, the terrain and the location of industrial facilities. Moreover, it is important to properly assess the destruction that will be caused by secondary casualty-producing effects, for example, the dispersal of clouds of strong acting toxic substances used in production, and others.

Based on this, the instructor then defines the volume of rescue operations which includes reconnaissance of the strike area; sealing off and extinguishing fires, searching for casualties and extracting them from obstructions, damaged and burning buildings and gas and smoke-filled rooms; uncovering destroyed, damaged and obstructed protective structures and rescuing the people in them; supplying air to obstructed protective structures; providing first aid and emergency medical treatment to victims; leading (transporting) people out of dangerous areas to safety; decontamination of people and clothing; decontamination of the territory, structures, transports and equipment.

Then, in transition to the first training issue--methods of searching for obstructed blast shelters and shelters and establishing contact with the people in them--the instructor points out:

"Specially trained reconnaissance teams search for obstructed protective structures. But, everybody else must also do this in order to help extract our comrades from danger more quickly.

"To determine the location of protective structures at the facility, they use a map of it and blast shelter (shelter) maps. In addition, it is possible to find protective structures based on external signs: intact emergency exit hatches, stairs to buried structures and also based on intact signs."

"If there are people in an obstructed blast shelter or shelter," the instructor continues, "try to get into it to determine the number and condition of the people sheltered in it and their supply of air, water and food. When it is not possible to do this, try to establish contact with them on the telephone or radio if they have survived. Use air inlets and other openings to talk to the people in the shelters. Tapping on the water or heat pipes going into the blast shelter or shelter can be used for these communications."

All of these procedures can be vividly demonstrated to the trainees if the lesson is conducted in a well-equipped training post or near a protective shelter with a follow-on training session. It is important that the trainees know how to use special signs to mark contaminated areas, passages through obstructions and the blast shelters and shelters that people will have to be extracted from.

The training issue--uncovering obstructed protective structures, searching for and extracting casualties--is worked on in conjunction with a training session and performance of standards Nos 11 and 12. The lesson instructor explains:

"Before these operations begin, it is necessary to isolate the damage to public utility systems which may endanger the people in the protective structures and the rescuers themselves. The fires near an obstructed shelter must be extinguished. If the shelter is filled with gas, it is necessary to shut off the gas and air out the facility using compressors and fans. Water is immediately pumped out of flooded structures."

Then, using the training posters or filmstrips, the instructor demonstrates the methods for uncovering protective structures located under wrecked buildings. This consists of clearing the obstruction over the emergency escape cap or hatch; stripping the obstruction away from the main entrance (around the stairwell) and then opening the protective door or cutting a hole in it; clearing the obstruction away from the building's outer wall over the emergency exit or digging out the exit well in the ground and punching a hole through the shelter wall; punching a hole through the wall from a neighboring room; clearing the obstruction over the roof and then punching a hole for an exit; driving a tunnel under the obstruction and cutting a hole in the shelter wall.

After this, the trainees work on standards Nos 11 and 12.

When working on the next standard--carrying a victim from the shelter--it is important that the trainees carry him properly without causing any injury during movement through the emergency hatch. If anybody makes any serious mistakes and the time for the standard is not up, the training session should be repeated.

The training issue--extracting victims from under obstructions--is studied in conjunction with standard No 13. The lesson instructor explains in advance:

"The search should begin first of all with basements, various recesses and road-side structures (pipes, ditches) and the spaces near the walls of the building's lower stories (inside and out). All of this is accomplished by a thorough inspection of areas with completely or partially wrecked buildings. Near areas where victims may be located, it is necessary to stop, shout and signal by striking parts of the obstruction or intact building parts. By carefully listening to all the sounds which may be answering signals from the victims, we can establish that there are people here.... When the victims have been approached, clear away everything that would interfere with dragging them out. Small fragments and broken stones are cast aside by hand. The head and chest are freed first."

The special features of rescue operations at night, in the winter and in hot areas are studied relative to local conditions. During operations at night, the lesson instructor focuses attention on

the fact that areas of operations are illuminated and sites being dug out in foundation obstructions, possible cave-in zones and other areas which are dangerous for transportation to pass or move and passages and turns are marked with prearranged illuminated signs.

The trainees' attention should be especially directed at complying with safety procedures. For example, passages cannot be made through obstructions without being firmly convinced that they are stable. While an obstruction is being cleared away, it is forbidden to walk or ride on top of it since individual pieces may shift and fall down and may strike the people clearing the obstruction. The operations are conducted carefully to preclude injuries to the rescuers and to prevent additional injuries to the victims.

Precautionary measures are also observed when working in smoke-filled facilities. They can only be entered in a hopcalite-cartridge gas mask and it is mandatory that a rope be tied to the individual so it will be possible to extract him from the smoke-filled facility in case of danger. Doors and windows are opened slowly; otherwise, a swift rush of air may cause flames to flare up. A gas fire or a POL fire cannot be extinguished with water. It is necessary to crawl or walk crouched over into a smoke-filled room.

At the end of the lesson, the instructor grades the trainees' activities, especially those in performing the practical jobs and standards.

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AIRBORNE COMBAT VEHICLE DESCRIBED

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 9, Sep 80 pp 12-13

[Article by Engr-Col Yu. Burtsev, candidate of technical sciences: "The Airborne Combat Vehicle"]

[Text] The next phase of the exercise was the paradrop. The airplanes approached the edge of the drop zone. The parachutes began to blossom like flowers in the azure sky. Under one of the parachutes the outline of a menacing combat vehicle could be made out as it approached the ground. It swung gently in its parachute strap. When only a few meters to the ground remained, the soft-landing system's powder charges on the parachute harness flared with a slight hiss.

The dust had not yet settled when the vehicle "came alive" through the efforts of the crew. The eyepieces on the viewing instruments on all sides moved about, and the vehicle took off for the nearest thicket. Its turret appeared over the brush and the cannon fired, after which the vehicle once again disappeared into the cover. After a few minutes it approached the shore of a swampy lake, entered the water and, churning up a white froth at the stern, crossed on the surface to the overgrowth of reeds on the opposite shore.

What kind of combat equipment is this, which has been supplied to airborne assault units? It is the BMD-1 armored amphibious tracked vehicle, capable of being air-dropped from the AN-12 aircraft by parachute or rocket-assisted parachute. It possesses high firepower, good maneuverability and improved crew-protection systems and equipment.

The BMD-1's level of firepower has been achieved through the use of an improved weapons system, the presence of a considerable ammunition load as well as through design improvements in the guidance and aiming instruments used. Its armament includes a 73-mm smoothbore gun and coupled 7.62-mm PKT machine-gun mounted in the turret, an antitank guided rocket system and two PKT hull machine-guns.

The gun is designed for engaging troops and enemy guns up to a range of 1,300 m. The ammunition load of 40 artillery rounds is housed in a mechanized ammunition stowage rack, which makes it possible to reload considerably faster. Owing to a special container for stowage of the machine-gun belts, fire from the main gun's coupled machine-gun can be carried out without reloading until the entire ammuntion load of 2,000 rounds is expended.

A cartridge-case and link collector mounted in the turret's underslung rotating platform serves to collect sabots, expended machine-gun cases and empty belt links from the coupled machine-gun. This device significantly reduces clutter in the crew compartments and decreases gas-fouling of the air during firing. This, together with the use of a pump to draw off powder gases, makes it possible to conduct fire from the BMD-1's weapons with a high degree of intensity.

The firepower of the turret's weapons is augmented by improvements in the observation and aiming instruments installed within. Target search and aiming of the main gun and coupled machine-gun during daytime and nighttime is accomplished with the aid of an integrated periscopic sight. It is a combination of two different instruments--an optical daytime instrument and a non-illuminated optico-electronic nighttime device.

The sight is well suited for use under various weather and climatic conditions due to the application of dehumidifying cartridges and an external glass heating system. A glass shield reliably protects the sight's entrance port from soot and keeps it from cracking when the antitank guided rocket is fired. A mechanical wiper mounted on the outside makes it possible to maintain visibilty through the sight even in rain or snow. The instrument's nighttime endurance limit is considerably increased through the use of a shutter mechanism that protects it from the gun's flash.

The speed and accuracy with which the turret's weapons can be brought to bear on a target are insured through the use of a solid-state electric drive with a mechanical back-up system.

In order to engage moving and stationary armored targets at ranges of 1,000 to 3,000 meters, provisions have been made for an antitank guided rocket system in the BMD-1, comprised of three wire-guided rockets. The PKT machine-guns installed in the left and right bow sections of the vehicle's hull in special ball mounts are used to engage lightly armored ground targets, troops and open fire weapons. Training of the machine-guns on the target is accomplished by inserting a TNPP-220 periscopic sight, to which the machine-guns are connected by parallelogram drives.

An additional increase in the vehicle's firepower is achieved by equipping the hull with three firing ports with ball mounts and observation devices, which makes it possible to conduct fire with the crew's hand arms--7.62-mm AKMS machine-guns, 7.62-mm RPKS light automatic machine-guns and the RPG-7 hand-held grenade launcher with five grenades.

The crew of the BMD-1 consists of five men. They are located within the armored hull, occupying the bow and stern sections (compartments). In the bow portion of the hull (the driving compartment) are seats for the commander, the driver-mechanic and the machine-gunner. The driver-mechanic's seat is in the middle. Here are located the driving controls and the instrument panel. The commander's seat is on the left, alongside of which are the radio and gyrocompass.

The gunner-operator's seat is mounted on an underslung rotating platform in the center compartment. The platform is cut off from the rest of the compartment by a "fence" created by the mechanized shell rack and the cartridge-case and link collector box. Behind the turret are seats for the senior gunner, the grenade launcher and his assistant.



BMD-1 Airborne Combat Vehicle

1 - Water-deflecting shield; 2 - Antitank guided rocket; 3 - Driver-mechanic's hatch; 4 - Gun elevating mechanism; 5 - Gunsight; 6 - Gunner-operator's hatch; 7 - TNPO-170 vision device; 8 - Artillery round; 9 - Escape hatch; 10 - MK-4s vision device; 11 - Hydrojet propulsion system; 12 - Motor; 13 - Pneumatic spring; 14 - Gunner-operator's seat; 15 - Cartridge-case and link collector; 16 - Driver-mechanic's seat; 17 - Track-tensioning mechanism.



BMD-1 Airborne Combat Vehicle
(additional views)

18 - Gyrocompass; 19 - R-123 radio; 20 - TNPP-220 sighting device; 21 - Driver-mechanic's instrument panel; 22 - Hydrojet cover lever; 23 - Reverse lever; 24 - Steering clutch lever; 25 - Gas pedal; 26 - Track brake pedal; 27 - Engine clutch pedal.

The efficient placement of armaments and crew within the vehicle increases its fire effect in combat--a zone of solid fire can be created around it.

The basis of the BMD-1's excellent maneuverability is its high power-to-weight ratio (more than 32 hp/t) and also the design improvements in the power plant, transmission and running gear. The power plant (up to 240 hp) and the transmission are made into a single power unit occupying the stern section of the vehicle's hull. It is separated from the crew compartments by an air-tight partition.

The advantage of the running gear is the independent suspension which combines a hydraulic system for altering the clearance and maintaining track tension with pneumatic springs. The capability to alter the clearance (from 100 to 450 mm) and to change the degree of track tension increases the shock-damping effect and the vehicle's cross country ability, decreases the vehicle's resistance when crossing water and makes it possible to secure the vehicle quickly for transport. The BMD-1 possesses rather high speeds--over 60 kph on land and up to 10 kph on the water.

The armored hull serves to protect the crew and the equipment from rifle fire and shell fragments, overcomes the effects of shock waves from a nuclear blast and insures a normal environment for the crew.

The hermetic sealing of the hull makes it possible to utilize a system for the collective protection of the crew from the effects of radioactive dust and toxic agents. The protective qualities and the survivability of the vehicle are likewise noticeably increased as a result of the application of an automatic fire-fighting system and the presence of a smoke-screening system and water-pumping equipment.

The exercise was successfully concluded. The paratroopers seized and held an important installation in the "enemy's" rear. The BMD-1 combat vehicles helped them to handle this difficult mission.
[0245-9512]

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U.S. TRIES TO VIOLATE MILITARY PARITY, UNDERMINE DETENTE

Moscow POLITCHESKOYE SAMOOBRAZOVANIYE in Russian No 9, 1980 pp 14-22

[Article by S. Losev: "The Present International Situation and the Fate of Detente"]

[Text] The June (1980) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee emphasized, with new vigor, the irrevocability of the foreign policy course worked out by the 24th and 25th congresses of our party, one of the most important components of which is a line of peaceful coexistence among states with different social structures, restraining the arms race, and preserving and developing detente. The CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government are displaying truly Leninist patience and principles in the present complex international situation, defending and implementing this line, insuring the security of the Soviet people, and offering a worthy repulse to imperialist claims.

The Communist Party attaches primary significance to keeping our state's foreign policy firm in defense of the interests of the Soviet people and the great achievements of socialism, and uncompromising in relation to aggressors, but at the same time flexible and realistic.

Progressive international society notes unanimously that it is precisely the Soviet Union, the CPSU, and its Central Committee that are displaying great historical responsibility in a fundamental issue of modern times: how to make the peace truly sound and indestructible, to achieve transformation of detente into a universal and irreversible process, and to promote its metamorphosis into a system of stable, fruitful, peaceful cooperation among nations.

Since the very first days following the conclusion of World War II our country has persistently, stubbornly, and patiently built the edifice of peace in Europe--on a continent where world wars began twice during the life span of the present generation. It is precisely owing to the scientifically grounded, realistic policy of the Soviet Union and fraternal socialist countries that the peoples of our continent have now been living in peace for 35 years.

Responding to questions posed by the editor's office of PRAVDA in connection with the fifth anniversary of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev noted:

"The main thing is to find a way to reduce the military threat, today and in the future, in Europe and, consequently, in the entire world. And this task would be impossible without real changes in the area of arms race limitation.

"And so, detente, cooperation, security--such is the general line of our party and the Soviet state in European affairs, as well as in world policy in general."

Our country is supporting this course by substantial, concrete actions. Despite the fact that the USA and the NATO military bloc are charging up international tension and causing the arms race in Europe to spiral upward, the Soviet Union consistently implemented its decision to withdraw up to 20,000 military servicemen, thousands of tanks, and a certain quantity of military equipment from the GDR into the USSR. This action, dictated by a sincere desire to encourage efforts at achieving military relaxation in Europe and to provide an example of real action in this direction, was completed by 1 August of the present year.

Guiding themselves by decisions adopted in the May conference of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact states, the socialist countries are also working persistently for a turning point in the Vienna talks on mutual reduction of armed forces and arms in Central Europe, which have now been marching in place for more than 7 years at the fault of the NATO powers, mainly the USA and the FRG.

Striving to achieve concrete, mutually acceptable results, on 10 July of this year the USSR, the GDR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia submitted far-reaching compromise proposals at Vienna, creating real possibilities for concluding, in the near future, agreements on reducing Soviet and American troops. According to this new initiative, troops of the USSR and the USA in Central Europe are to be reduced in the first phase respectively by 20,000 and 13,000 men, which takes account of their present strength. Were we to consider in this case the Soviet servicemen who were withdrawn unilaterally from the GDR, this would mean a sum total of more than 50,000 servicemen leaving Central Europe. Then, following these reductions, the proposal is to establish an equal collective troop strength in this region for NATO and the Warsaw Pact--900,000 men each.

Implementation of the proposals of the socialist countries would be an important practical step on the road to deepening political detente in Europe, its supplementation by detente in the military area, and reinforcement of our continent's security and of trust among states.

* * *

As is noted in the decree "On the International Situation and the Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union" adopted by the June Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, the recent positive processes "have been countered by aggressive imperialist forces with a policy dictated by a reluctance to accept the realities of the modern world--the stronger positions of socialism, the successes of the national liberation movement, and growth in the freedom-loving democratic forces in general.... The leaders of the NATO military bloc, and mainly the USA, have accepted a course of disturbing the military balance that has evolved in the world, in its favor and at the expense of the Soviet Union and the socialist countries, at the expense of international detente and the security of nations."

Such are the grounds for imperialism's line of intensifying the arms race, creating provocations against socialist and other independent states, encouraging militarist activity by NATO, and broadening its functions as a tool of imperialist dictatorship. Last year's decision by the NATO Council to produce and locate, in West Europe, about 600 new American cruise missiles and medium-range missiles, as an addition to the forward-based American nuclear resources already there, was the most dangerous manifestation of this aggressive course.

Recall that it was already a long time ago that the Pentagon deployed a large quantity of forward-based nuclear resources in Europe and on the Mediterranean Sea, aimed at the USSR and its allies. I am referring to bombers based in England and the FRG, the Phantom fighter-bombers armed with nuclear weapons deployed on the aircraft carriers of the American Sixth Fleet. These have now been supplemented by submarines armed with Poseidon missiles carrying from 500 to 800 warheads.

It is entirely obvious that deployment of new American medium-range missiles, were it to be achieved, would dramatically worsen the situation on the European continent. An increase in destructive potential would inevitably affect the political climate and the vital interests of the continent's nations. It stands to reason that the Soviet Union would not permit the USA and the NATO bloc to disturb the military-strategic balance in their favor. The USSR and the Warsaw Pact countries have warned in all seriousness that were the Pentagon to dare deploy new American missiles in West Europe, the Soviet Union and its allies would take effective retalitory steps to restore the disturbed balance.

Our country is decisively against confrontation, and this is precisely why the USSR and its allies suggest negotiation.

In recent Moscow meetings between the leaders of the USSR and the FRG the Soviet side proposed a new initiative having the purpose of relaxing the critical situation created by NATO's plan to locate American missiles in Europe. In order to avert this turn of events, dangerous to peace, the USSR proposed entering into bilateral talks with the USA on the question of medium-range nuclear missiles, in organic unity with the issue of forward-based American nuclear resources. Such negotiations could be started before ratification of the SALT II Treaty; however, any agreements reached in these negotiations could be implemented only after the SALT II Treaty is ratified and goes into effect.

FRG Chancellor H. Schmidt characterized the Soviet proposals as "new and constructive" "They reinforce my opinion," he said, "that negotiations concerning limitation of medium-range missiles are not only necessary but also possible." Even those organs of the Western press that relate with invariable prejudice to Soviet initiatives, were forced to recognize the merits of the USSR's proposals this time. "These proposals," states an editorial in the American newspaper THE PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, "offer a way out of the dead end. They demonstrate the USSR's obvious readiness to begin talks on this problem. Such talks are necessary, since solving the problem of preventing nuclear war depends on them to a considerable degree."

As far as the official reaction of J. Carter's administration is concerned, for the moment it is extremely indefinite and ambiguous. While they do not reject the Soviet initiative, American representatives make it understood that negotiations on medium-range weapons could probably begin only after the presidential elections in the USA, and that the government of the United States would want to exclude the issue of American forward-based resources from the negotiations.

At the same time Washington demands some sort of additional "proofs" of the peaceful intentions of our country. But are such proofs really necessary? In the last 10 years the Soviet Union has not increased the number of nuclear weapon carriers within its European territory. Naturally, as with our opponents, we have also modernized our missiles. But during this time the number of medium-range missile launching pads and the power of the nuclear warheads of these missiles managed to even decrease somewhat.

There is one more important consideration--in contrast to the USA, the USSR does not deploy such missiles on the territory of other states.

The USSR is not trying to achieve military superiority or to create a first-strike potential. We are prepared for sincere and just negotiations based on strict compliance with the principle of equality and identical security. But no one should doubt the fact that the USSR and the Warsaw Pact countries have everything they would need to foil the adventurous hopes harbored by Washington and NATO for achieving military superiority.

Further deepening of cooperation among socialist countries in politics, economics, defense, and other areas and the constructive activity of their joint organizations--the Warsaw Pact and CEMA--are multiplying our strength and dependably serving the cause of peace and progress.

The May conference of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact members, held in Warsaw, once again emphasized, with full force, the significance of fraternal solidarity of socialist countries to maintenance of universal peace and assurance of international security, and it once again demonstrated the noble role of socialism in the causes of peace, and its consistent internationalism and unwavering love of peace. The Declaration adopted at the conference suggests a concrete and constructive program of measures to eliminate centers of tension and trends in international development that offer a danger to nations.

One of the important factors of present international development is the unprecedented activity of the popular masses, manifested as fierce intolerability of tyranny and aggression, and an unbending insistence upon peace. This is the result of historical experience, accumulated by mankind, it is the result of the influence of the peace-loving policies of socialist countries. Memories of the bitter lessons of the first and second world wars and an understanding of the terrible consequences of using nuclear weapons commandingly call the people to active antimilitary efforts.

Growth in cooperation among communist and workers' parties in the international arena and development of contacts and joint actions with socialist, social-democratic, and peasant parties and organizations, and all democratic forces in the interests of a sound peace in Europe and in the entire world is an object of constant concern of the CPSU and the fraternal parties.

The Warsaw Declaration devotes primary attention to preparations for a conference on military detente and disarmament in Europe. In particular, practical decisions could be made at the forthcoming Madrid meeting of the Helsinki Conference participants on the tasks and agenda of this conference, and on the time, place, and order of its business.

Countries of the socialist fraternity are also insisting upon the fastest possible successful conclusion of negotiations on complete and universal prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, on prohibition of radiological weapons, on prohibition of chemical weapons and destruction of their reserves, on the impermissibility of using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states not possessing such weapons on their territory, and on deployment of nuclear weapons on the territories of states not having such weapons at the present time.

* * *

Unfortunately the military-strategic policy of the USA and NATO runs counter to the objective needs for improving the international climate. Rather than accepting the Warsaw Pact's proposal and sitting down to examine, for example within the UN, the issue of limiting and reducing military presence and military activities in the Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific oceans, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Persian Gulf, the United States is increasing its military potential in these regions at a forced pace, and it is creating new military bases and outposts to support operations by interventionist "rapid deployment forces".

The entire notorious "process of peace", which supposedly began as a result of the separate Egypt-Israeli Camp David Agreement, for practical purposes boiled down to the Pentagon's acquisition of military bases in Oman, Somali, and in Egypt itself, to accelerated armament of Israeli expansionists and the Sadat regime, which is groveling before imperialism and Zionism, and to transfer of an armada of 35 American warships to the Persian Gulf. The American military command now plans to create a permanent Fifth Fleet for operations in the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Sea, and the Indian Ocean. It is clear to any sane individual that these are preparations having nothing in common with achieving peace in the Near East.

Establishment of a sound peace in the Near East would be possible only via a universal political settlement arrived at with the direct participation of all interested sides, including the Arab Palestine nation, as represented by the Palestine Liberation Organization, on the basis of respect for the legal interests of all states and peoples in the region. A political settlement in the Near East would require that no state would interfere in the internal affairs of the countries and peoples of the region, or encroach upon their natural resources.

But what sort of policy is the United States pursuing here? In a message to Congress on 23 January of this year, President J. Carter made an open claim of some sort of "right" of American imperialism to dictate its will and to impose regimes advantageous to the USA in the Near East, and equally so in any other region of Asia, Africa, and Latin America which Washington would declare to be a sphere of its "vitally important interests". Moreover, under the guise of "defense" and assurance of unhindered deliveries of Near East oil to the West, the President threatened the use of "all necessary resources, including military force" to defend these "vitally important interests".

Creation of a "rapid deployment" interventionist corps, erection of a major American air force and naval base on the island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, transfer of floating bases together with heavy military equipment and ammunition to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, and construction of military transport air-

craft specially intended to ferry assault troops to remote regions--all of this attests to Washington's attempts at resurrecting "gunboat diplomacy" aimed against the developing countries.

According to the well informed newspaper THE NEW YORK TIMES, back in mid-1977 Presidential Assistant for National Security Z. Brzezinski "stated his support for the creation of rapid deployment forces that could be used in the event of crises in Third World countries.... The idea of creating these forces was generally approved by Carter in August 1977. At the end of February 1979 Brzezinski persuaded the President to agree to a more-active role in the Near East, to include the sale of weapons, maintaining a naval presence in the Indian Ocean, and creating military bases."

The American military machine allocated, for the "rapid deployment forces", 110,000 soldiers stationed in the USA, including the 82nd Airborne Division; moreover the American Marine Corps is providing another 40,000-45,000 marine infantry to the command of these forces. Nine billion dollars were allocated for the purchase of military equipment for the American Rapid Deployment Forces in accordance with a five year plan announced at the end of 1979.

The course toward creating interventionist "rapid deployment forces" is an obvious departure from the "Nixon Doctrine" declared in the early 1970's, which foresaw protection of the USA's imperialist interests in various regions of the world by foreign hands. In the Near East, for example, which provides two-thirds of the world's total exported oil, Iran was given the role of American policeman.

Deposing Mosaddeq's regime in 1953 and returning Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi to the throne, in the course of 25 years the CIA and the Pentagon generously supplied the most up-to-date weapons and instructors to the Iranian army. The Shah became the USA's first client in the purchases of American military equipment with income from petroleum sales, which paid the bills of American weapons manufacturers rather than being used for the needs of the economy. It would be sufficient to point out that since 1973 the Shah placed military orders with the United States totaling $20 billion.

The French bourgeois newspaper LE MONDE recalls to us that one of the main bulwarks of the Shah's power--the Savak secret police--"was created in 1957 and organized and financed with the assistance of the CIA, as well as with the cooperation of Israeli and English secret services, which sent their advisers there."

Washington sent more and more consignments of military materials necessary for repression to the Shah's army: tear gas, billy clubs, flamethrowers, hand grenades, and other weapons. Helicopters that shot down demonstrators and tanks that crushed them also bore the "Made in USA" label. Nevertheless President Carter asserts that the United States "has no grounds for reproaching itself" for what went on in Iran with the support and incitation of American advisers.

After the Shah's regime fell, Washington began seeking a replacement for him in the reactionary regimes of Sadat and Begin. Apparently, however, not being sure that Sadat might not suffer the same fate as the Shah, the Pentagon now relies more upon American infantry and assault troops in this region.

American strategists gave the Shah's Iran the role of an anti-Soviet military springboard, and they actively utilized electronic reconnaissance and listening bases created by them in the country's north to spy on the USSR. After the fall of its royal puppet, Washington turned its eyes on Afghanistan, hoping to transform it into a springboard for subversive activities against the USSR.

There never would have been a so-called "Afghan crisis", had American imperialists and Beijing hegemonists not interfered in the internal affairs of the DRA. On 27 December 1979, when Babrak Karmal was unanimously elected Chairman of the Revolutionary Council and Prime Minister of the DRA, the country was at the brink of a counterrevolutionary turning point.

As Karmal related in an interview with the journal HORIZON, just a month after the April revolution Amin, who was serving as the minister of foreign affairs, took part in a special session of the UN General Assembly in New York, where he met with representatives of the American administration. Upon his return, Amin forged a counterrevolutionary conspiracy. The proposal was to subdivide Afghanistan. The eastern and southern territories of the country were to be given to Pakistan, while the northern regions were to be ceded to China. A terrorist regime headed by Amin, answering directly or indirectly to the CIA, was to be created in Kabul itself.

As we can see, Afghanistan was threatened from within by Amin's counterrevolution, which was to blame for the annihilation of thousands of patriots, and it was threatened from without by aggressive plans that placed the national independence, territorial integrity, and sovereignty of Afghanistan in danger. Under these conditions the national leadership of the DRA sought military aid from the USSR on the basis of the Treaty of Friendship.

As Comrade L. I. Brezhnev emphasized in his report to the June Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, "There is not a grain of self-interest in the Soviet action to aid Afghanistan. We had no choice other than to send troops. Events have confirmed that this was the only correct decision." As we know, the CPSU Central Committee Plenum completely approved the steps taken to render full aid to Afghanistan in the matter of repelling armed attacks and interference from without, pursuing the goal of suffocating the Afghan revolution and creating a pro-imperialist springboard of military aggression on the southern borders of the USSR. The plenum voted in favor of political settlement of the situation in Afghanistan. This would mean, as the government of the DRA declared, complete cessation of aggression against this country, and dependable guarantees against subversive activity initiated from outside its borders.

It is precisely in the context of such a settlement that the issue of withdrawing Soviet troops from the DRA could be resolved. But judging from everything, political settlement is clearly not what Washington, London, and Beijing want. The USA is doing everything it can to hinder direct negotiations between Afghanistan and Iran and between Afghanistan and Pakistan, during which the most complex issues could be practically solved. The CIA, the English "Intelligence Service", and the Beijing hegemonists are enlarging their deliveries of weapons to bandit formations, and they are activating, on Pakistani territory, the training of terrorists and assassins who are being ferried into Afghan territory by the thousands.

The imperialists and their henchmen obviously forget that there is no return to the old Afghanistan, and that there can never be one. The internal structure of Afghanistan is the business of the Afghan people themselves, and no one should transgress upon this sovereign right.

As far As the USSR is concerned, by reducing the Soviet military contingent in the DRA it has once again confirmed its desire for a political settlement, rather than for military resolution of the problems that have evolved around Afghanistan. False accusations by highly placed American officials, who suggest that the USSR is trying to break through to the warm seas and place itself within reaching distance of Near East oil, are meeting a repulse even from moderate and conservative Arab politicians.

Kuwait Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Al-Jabir Al-Sabah recently noted that American assertions that the Soviet Union brought its troops into Afghanistan in order to lay a path to petroleum deposits in the Persian Gulf region are devoid of any sort of grounds. It is generally known, the minister recalled, that the USSR not only extracts but also exports oil. Under the cover of a fabricated "Soviet danger", the USA is itself exerting pressure upon the Arabs in an attempt to keep them from raising the prices on oil and to acquire new miltary bases in this region for the United States. It is precisely the presence of an armada of American warships outfitted with nuclear missiles that creates a threat to the security of both states in this region and the USSR.

Wherever political tension or a situation of conflict exists, be it in the Near or Middle East, Southeast Asia, or the south of Africa, or be it any other region of the world, it is the direct duty of all states to do nothing that would promote deterioration of the situation, and instead to do everything to help ease the tension and make a contribution to normalizing the situation. It is precisely this line, the May Declaration of the Warsaw Pact states emphasizes, that the socialist countries are strictly following.

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The Soviet leadership has warned the U.S. administration many times that our country will not allow it to threaten the interests of the national security of the USSR and the socialist fraternity. We have suggested, and continue to suggest to the United States, that it base its relations on the principles of peaceful coexistence, which were the foundation for the summit document "Fundamental Principles of Mutual Relationships Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America" signed in 1972. After all, the fate of detente and the fate of universal peace depend in many ways on the mutual relations that evolve between the two big powers, in whose hands the overwhelming part of the world's nuclear arsenal is concentrated.

Hostility between the USA and the USSR is not only unnatural, but it is also dangerous. And it is not our fault that Soviet-American relations recently underwent dramatic deterioration. The responsibility for this lies with the present leadership of the USA, which is pursuing a line of subverting detente and aggravating the international situation, and which is trying to dictate its will in relation to socialist states and other peace-loving countries. It is the USA, and not the USSR, that has assumed a course toward intensification of the arms race, in

the vain hope of disturbing the military balance that has evolved in the world. It is the USA, and not the USSR, that has assumed the course of economic "sanctions" and the breaking of economic, scientific-technical, cultural, and sports ties, rejecting all of the obligations it has assumed, violating dozens of signed international agreements, and ascribing to itself the Kulak right to "punish" other nations and states, to teach them how they should live. Aggressive circles in the USA have assumed the road of closer ties with the Chinese leadership on an anti-Soviet basis hostile to peace, even though it would seem that Washington should reckon with the fact that partnership with Beijing hegemonism is a danger to all mankind, including to the American and Chinese peoples.

These sharp changes in U.S. policy were not a surprise. Back in the 1970's when improvements were achieved in the international situation and the United States, reckoning with the growth of the economic and defensive power of the socialist countries, was forced to switch from confrontation to negotiation, American ruling circles assumed a number of self-interested goals having no relationship to real detente. Washington intended to capitalize upon detente as a means of indulging decayed pro-imperialist antipopular regimes in developing countries; it believed that a situation of peaceful coexistence between two socioeconomic systems could be exploited as a means for subverting the unity of the socialist fraternity, for intensifying ideological penetration into the countries of socialism, and for driving a wedge between socialist and developing states, and between the socialist fraternity and the national liberation movements--our natural allies.

But the final score was not in favor of imperialism. It was precisely in the atmosphere of detente that the number of countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America that rejected dependence upon imperialism and selected a socialist orientation grew. The desire to alter the course of historic development at all costs is what lies at the basis of present attempts by imperialism, mainly American imperialism, to resurrect the "position of strength" policy and return, to the United States, its irretrievably lost military-strategic superiority.

However, the situation of the United States today is such that new foreign political adventures are threatening serious shocks within the country itself. In recent years capitalism--American capitalism primarily--has found itself in a new crisis. The greatest decline in production in more than 40 years, followed by a lengthy recession, the continuing growth of unemployment which has affected many millions of laborers, the currency crisis, unrestrainable inflation, disastrous pollution of the environment, corruption, and political scandals are all raising public protest and causing ever-increasing disenchantment with the capitalist order and with Washington's policy.

In other words the future American administration--be it Democratic or Republican--will have to do some house-cleaning after the November elections.

In the Western world where interimperialist conflicts are growing among three centers--the USA, the European "Common Market", and Japan--the economic weight and influence of the United States are steadily declining. As was noted in the journal U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT in a commentary on the economic conference in Venice attended by the heads of seven leading capitalist countries, "decades of disorder in the United States and relative reduction of American military power have undermined the influence of Washington upon its allies.... It is believed that America will be forced to share its decision making authority with its partners, who were

monopolized by the former over a long period of time. And even this may be found to be insufficient to restore the unity of the alliance, in view of the growing divergence of interests between the USA and West Europe."

The vital national interests of West European countries are inseparable from the fate of detente because in the event of confrontation, they will be the first sacrifices to the unwise policy of the USA. Moreover even the economic advantages enjoyed by these states from a policy of cooperation with socialist countries are highly tangible. West Europe, especially France and the FRG, did not support the unpromising attempts of the U.S. government and Congress to "punish" the USSR and impose an economic and trade boycott upon it. Everyone in Europe realized that such actions are the product of incorrect ideas about the economic and military potential of the Soviet Union.

The constructive experience of Franco-Soviet and Soviet-West German summit meetings attests to the fact that the conditions are being created for holding summit meetings attended by the leaders of states in all regions of the world. The Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact states emphasized in its May Declaration that the attention of participants of such a meeting must be focused on a task disturbing both the European nations and all mankind--the task of eliminating the centers of international tension, and of preventing war. Special attention should be turned in this case to the issues of European security, of preserving the peace in Europe.

* * *

As is emphasized in the decree of the June Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, detente is the natural result of the balance of forces that evolved in recent decades in the world arena. The military-strategic balance that has been achieved between the world of socialism and the world of capitalism is of fundamental, historical significance. It is a factor hindering the aggressive desires of imperialism, and it reflects the fundamental interests of all peoples. Hopes of disturbing this balance are fated to failure.

Our country is approaching the 26th CPSU Congress at the peak of its power. In this important period of history, the Soviet people express their unanimous support for the domestic and foreign policy of the CPSU, and an unshakable resolve to strengthen the motherland's economic and defensive power with shock labor.

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NEW BOOKS ON U.S. MILITARISTIC COURSE

Moscow KNIZHNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 38, 19 Sep 80 p 5

[Col V. Gannochka review: "Imperialism's Intrigues"]

[Text] The CPSU Central Committee June (1980) Plenum observed that the leaders of NATO and the United States have embarked on a course aimed at changing the evolved military equilibrium in their favor. "Whence," the plenum decree emphasizes, "imperialism's policy of stepping up the arms race, the unleashing of provocations against the socialist and other independent states and NATO's militaristic activeness and the extension of its functions as the tool of imperialist diktat."

The following books published by Voyenizdat may serve as sound and convincing corroboration of this conclusion: "Imperializm i militarizm" [Imperialism and Militarism] by A.A. Migolat'yev, "Opasnaya stavka: nauchno-tekhnickeskaya revolyutsiya i voyennyye prigotovleniya SShA" [A Dangerous Gamble: The Scientific-Technical Revolution and the United States' Military Preparations] by V.V. Borisov and "SShA i NATO: istochniki voyennoy ugrozy" [The United States and NATO: Sources of the Threat of War] by N.F. Petrov, N.I. Sokolov, P.P. Katin and I.V. Vladimirov.

On the basis of a wealth of factual material Prof Col A.A. Migolat'yev, doctor of philosophy, reveals in his book "Imperializm i militarizm" the socioeconomic bases and class essence of contemporary militarism. He shows its general features and singularities in individual countries and describes the military-industrial complex of the United States and other states. The book analyzes the problems of a relaxation of tension and the reasons for the rebirth of relapses into the "cold war" and the intensification of the ideological struggle.

A particular feature of V.V. Borisov's monograph is that it shows American imperialism in the period of the scientific-technical revolution, which has materially influenced the United States' military preparations. A reorganization of the entire American military machine has taken place and reliance has been put in technical superiority under modern conditions.

The authors of the book "SShA i NATO: istochniki voyennoy ugrozy" comprehensively examine the aggressive nature and main directions of the military policy of the most important capitalist states in the modern era, reveal its danger for socialism, the revolutionary workers and national liberation movement and world peace and show the reactionary thrust and aims of the military organizational development of the United States and the other NATO countries.

All the books convincingly prove the notion that imperialism is the source of wars and international tension. This is attested by the growth of the capitalist countries' military spending. Thus the United States' direct military spending from 1949 through 1979-1980 increased more than tenfold, from $13.5 billion to $141.2 billion. In the 1980-1981 fiscal year it is planned to grant the Pentagon $153.7 billion for the direct implementation of military programs. The overall level of military appropriations will be raised to $170.5 billion this year. In 1985 it is planned to spend almost $250 billion for militarist purposes along Pentagon lines alone. The appropriations of the NATO states for military purposes amounted to almost $2.8 trillion in the period 1959-1979.

The American imperialists' aspiration to world domination is also manifested in the fact that since 1945 the United States has on 215 occasions resorted to armed force or the threat thereof, including 33 occasions when it has threatened the use of nuclear weapons. A particularly reactionary role in the life of the imperialist states is performed, as the books convincingly show, by the military-industrial complex. It is the nucleus of militarization, contributing to the prodigious enrichment of the industrial concerns.

According to data of a U.S. Senate committee, the profits of 164 out of 169 American military-industrial corporations--active suppliers of arms to the Pentagon and other war departments of the NATO countries--constitute from 5 to 200 percent, of 3 over 100 percent and of 1 over 2,000 percent. On average the profits of the American military-industrial monopolies are 50-60 percent higher than in the sectors engaged in the production of products for peaceful purposes.

Arms exports from the imperialist countries are a kind of barometer of the West's militaristic activeness. According to UN data, up to 15 percent of the weapons produced in the capitalist world annually are supplied for export. The annual volume of the arms trade has increased 70-80-fold here in the last quarter century. Since the war the United States' international monopolies have supplied 136 countries with arms worth $100 billion. Arms exports are leading to an increase in international tension and support for reactionary regimes.

The relevance of the works under review lies in the fact that they comprehensively analyze the problems of the correlation of a relaxation of international tension and contempoary militarism. The enterprising and mobilizing role of the USSR and the socialist community countries in the struggle to establish the principles of peaceful coexistence with states with different social systems is shown in this connection.

Actively opposing the arms race, the USSR has recently submitted over 100 proposals on disarmament issues for study by international organizations and the governments of other countries. The participants in the meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee came out with a new initiative. They proposed a meeting at the highest level of the leaders of states and discussion of the task of removing centers of international tension and preventing war.

However, as a counterweight to the peace initiatives of the USSR and other countries of the socialist community, aggressive circles of the imperialist states have embarked on a policy of reviving the "cold war." They are stepping up the arms race and sharply increasing NATO's militarist activeness.

All these books are aimed at a broad readership. They will be of great benefit in agitation-mass work and will help Soviet people to fathom in even greater depth the intricate labyrinth of contemporary international life and acquire a clear idea of the sources of the danger of war and the intrigues of the imperialists. Their contents call for vigilance and the need to reliably strengthen our motherland's defense might.

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SOVIET, WESTERN NUCLEAR WAR DOCTRINES COMPARED

Paris DEFENSE NATIONALE in French Oct 80 pp 25-44

[Article by the GERSS (Group for Study and Research on Soviet Strategy)]

[Text] DEFENSE NATIONALE in 1978 and 1980 published two articles[1] on rather closely related subjects. Those two articles had the same disadvantage--that of making reference only to American work or American translations of Soviet documents. The Group for Study and Research on Soviet Strategy, under the jurisdiction of the National Defense Studies Foundation, has the very great advantage, and the very great merit, of drawing directly from the most authentic and best known Soviet sources. Its subject is also more extensive since it also deals with French deterrent doctrine.

Since 1945 the West's doctrines for handling the nuclear threat in time of peace or war have developed in accordance with the perception of the adversary potential, each country's own political objectives, and the advent of new techniques. The United States, starting with the basic concept of "massive reprisals," refined it into the doctrines of "flexible response," "anti-forces strike," or "selective strike." In order to mount a striking force serving modest political objectives, the French have relied upon the idea of disproportion between the "French stake" and the risks to which their strategic nuclear force exposes the potential aggressor.

In the area of nuclear strategies it is important for us of the West to know how the Soviets perceive our doctrines, whose purpose is not only to pose a threat, like any conventional military doctrine, but also to define clearly the political commitments which they are to serve. The Soviet opinion at the same time in events related to its policy, in its military preparation efforts, and in written doctrinal works. These last must not be neglected for, in the Soviet society, they have a validity greater than mere intentions. In fact, they serve as basic preparation for war among the armed forces and the population.

It is in these writings where, after a brief reminder of the spirit and content of the Soviet military doctrine, we shall seek the perceptions and critiques of the West's nuclear strategies from the time of "massive reprisals" up to the most

recent developments in American and French strategy. These perceptions can be direct when the West's doctrines are explicitly called into question or indirect when the Soviet doctrine adopts opposite positions.

I. Soviet Military Doctrine

For the Soviets the military doctrine is by definition the government's doctrine, consisting of opinions, with scientific basis, on the nature and special characteristics of the next war, the methods of preparing for it and waging it to a victorious conclusion. It therefore has both cognitive and didactive aspects. It is the work of the Communist Party at its highest level--the Central Committee--which, in its preparation relies upon military science[2] and Marxism-Leninism. The Marxist-Leninist perception of the world is essentially the competition between two systems whose outcome can only be the victory of socialism and which cannot end with any definitive compromise at all. The forms the competition takes are determined by the ratio of forces under each circumstance in each region. The present ratio of forces is in socialism's favor. At the end of World War II it was transformed into fact by the formation of a socialist camp. The equilibrium in the area of armaments which seems to be established, even if it is uncertain and the efforts of the parties to upset it to their advantage, results in a shifting of the competition, even more so than in the post-war years, to the economic, ideological, and political domains. Starting from these facts the party defined, and since 1956 has exploited, the policy of peaceful coexistence but, for the Soviets, such a policy is possible only by virtue of strengthening the socialist camp. In their opinion the capitalist camp will accept it only because it is driven to that by the present ratio of forces. The policy of peaceful coexistence therefore should assure the victory of socialism. It includes seeking the military power which serves as its basis and to which it assigns objectives through a doctrine.

While recognizing that the state of peaceful coexistence does not make war inevitable the Soviet military doctrine emphasizes that the danger of seeing the imperialists unleash a war must not be minimized for capitalism retains its aggressive nature. The Soviets' continued strengthening of their military potential is only a measure to counter it; in this sense the Soviet strategy is endeavoring to be offensive but not aggressive. The most dangerous form of conflict would then be that in which coalitions of countries would oppose different social regimes. The political stakes would be the destruction of one of the systems and installation of the other as the universal system. At that time all economic, ideological, political, and military resources would be exploited and the conflict take on the shape of a generalized nuclear war.

Among the basic military-technical principles the importance attributed to the nuclear weapon can be emphasized. It will be the principal means of destruction, thanks to the effective vehicle which is the rocket. Conventional armed forces will retain their effectiveness for exploiting strategic or tactical nuclear strikes. The war of the future will thus have an intercontinental character. It will be quick and violent but, because of the resources and distances involved, it is not out of the question to see it prolonged. Organization of armed forces must be adapted to the varied conditions of modern combat. In the

preparations the rear must not be forgotten because the difference between front and rear will become blurred. Important missions are assigned to civil defense.

Such is the political and military-technical framework within which the Soviet doctrine has been developed. That doctrine is deeply impregnated with Marxist-Leninist ideology whose postulate is the preeminence of the socialistic system over all others. That postulate, necessary for the indoctrination of the masses, makes delicate the distinction between the ultimate political objectives and the reality which is subject to circumstantial compromises. Moreover, the doctrine is in its essence changeable. "The fact is that the military doctrine is not static. Its content changes in accordance with the political situation and modification of economic and military-technical factors. Its military-technical content changes considerably more often."[3]

But, even though the content changes, the foundations remain: Marxism-Leninism.

II. Deterrence and Victory in Nuclear Warfare

The destructive power of the nuclear weapon gave rise to the idea that the defense of a country and its interests could be based upon the threat of unleashing a nuclear war in the event that an aggressor crossed a more or less well-defined line of demarcation. Resting upon the severity of the damage that a possible aggressor would suffer, this strategy could be exploited in a situation where there is a monopoly of nuclear weapons in the form of the American doctrine of "massive reprisals" and where there is a situation of oligopoly in the form of the doctrine of "mutually assured destruction" or in those of French deterrence based upon the supposed disparity between the risks and the stakes. Even though political interests may vary, depending upon the doctrine, in every case it is expected to avoid war by posing the threat, since putting it into practice is considered to be suicidal for the two adversaries because no possible defense exists. For that reason the West's doctrines recognize that there can be no winner in a nuclear conflict and give priority to offensive methods at the expense of defense.

In the Soviet Union, more so than in the West, the definition of a nuclear doctrine was the result of discussions involving both military and political figures. The positions were contradictory but evolved to stability toward the end of the 1960 decade. Thus it is not surprising to find that the positions of some Soviet theoreticians could be identified with certain aspects of the doctrine of "massive reprisals."

In the period of the American monopoly of nuclear weapons Stalin considered, or made it seem that he considered, that they had no military value at all. Up to 1955 Malenkov adhered to that opinion in stating that the use of nuclear weapons would result in great destruction only but without military significance, that only conventional weapons would make victory possible. At the time of his being shunted aside he was reproached for having maintained that "the atomic threat is such that the instigators of a war will not dare to use their bombs since they will decide not to commit suicide."[4] Indeed, much later still other theoreticians

took a stand against the supposed usefulness of the nuclear weapon. Thus, Marshal Talenskij wrote in 1965: "In our times the worst illusion would be the belief that thermonuclear war can still serve as a political instrument, that one may at the same time achieve political aims by using the nuclear weapon and himself escape unscathed."[5]

These positions, even though not constituting pure and simple acceptance of the theory of deterrence with the nuclear weapon, cast doubt upon the possibility of a victory that is military as well as political. However, the opinions emphasizing the irrationality of nuclear war have not prevailed and a doctrine for use of nuclear weapons was elaborated.

Politically, the strategy of massive reprisals was presented to the East as blackmail of the Soviet Union intended to make it abandon the peoples' democracies and the national liberation movements, and to which it was appropriate to respond by strengthening the socialist camp. Starting in 1956 such strengthening made the policy of peaceful coexistence possible. However, some deny that nuclear weapons have the ability to guarantee peace and there is criticism of those who believe that "the war itself has become paralyzed"[6] and that peaceful coexistence is guaranteed by "the development of nuclear weapons." "Impossible, of course, to agree with such opinions,"[7] concludes the article criticizing the statements of Talenskij whose positions are attacked as having a demobilizing character. The Soviet doctrine goes on to affirm that victory is possible and to define its conditions. Rybkin, Talenskij's detractor, shows the way: "... the more deliberately and rapidly the aggressive acts of imperialism are brought to an end, the smaller will be the destructive consequences of war."[8]

The official doctrine fully supports this position: "By its decisions the party and the government make it the obligation of our armed forces to be always in a state of complete preparedness so that they may, by decisive action, cause the plans of the aggressors to fail and strike them with highly destructive blows."[9] It recommends rapid and massive use of strategic nuclear forces in the first phase of the war, even advancing the necessity for a first strike: "Massive nuclear strikes against the armed forces of the adversary and key economic and political objectives can decide the victory of one of the camps and the defeat of the other at the beginning of the war. Thus, a correct estimate of the elements for gaining supremacy over the adversary and the ability to use them before he does are the keys to victory in such a war."[10]

However, the war does not end with one or several nuc anges. Beyond the material and moral destruction of the enemy in the heart his territory, the objectives of liquidating the last resistance and occupying territory are assigned to the ground forces. Political control will next be achieved by installing regimes favorable to the USSR.

The doctrine's offensive aspect is complemented by a defensive one whose extent contrasts with the modest efforts of the West in this sphere. The priority nature of the active defense is shown in the development of the air defense forces, the PVO,[11] whose mission is to protect "the population, the administrative, political, and economic centers as well as the armed forces against enemy air

attacks, and also by the existence of civil defense with ambitious objectives.[12] These positions are indeed in total contradiction to those of the advocates of reciprocal vulnerability which are opposed to any form of defense against nuclear attack on the grounds that any action tending to make the destruction less punishing for one of the camps would be interpreted as an aggressive intention by the other, for in this way the equilibrium of mutual deterrence would be upset and the security of the two parties weakened. The Soviet doctrine asserts that territorial defense "strengthens international security which constitutes a whole."[13] In the signing of the 1972 treaty prohibiting the deployment of antiballistic missiles (the ABM Treaty) one must not read a renunciation of the policy of territorial defense but a decision under the circumstances motivated by the technological lag of the doctrine's imperatives.

The Soviet military doctrine therefore does not accord deterrent character to nuclear weapons alone. For it the defense policy must have a wider political and military basis. Neither does it recognize the state of "nonwar" in which the West's doctrines result and asserts that a victory is possible if the force and determination are available. The objective of military science then is to formulate the conditions of that force and determination.

III. The "Flexible Response"

The evolution of the American nuclear strategy was caused by the development of the Soviet strategic nuclear forces, particularly since the beginning of the 1960 decade, of the ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missiles] capable of reaching American territory. The adaptation of the strategy of "massive reprisals" to a situation which tended toward parity of strategic resources then materialized at the doctrinal level by the introduction of the concept of "mutually assured destruction."[14] The adversary who would have unleashed a massive nuclear strike against the United States would be assured of suffering intolerable damage involving from one-quarter to one-half of its population and half of its industry. But even if the balance of terror was soon to be guaranteed by arms control agreements such as SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty], that situation had weaknesses for two obvious reasons:

--nuclear weapons became weapons of last resort to be employed in desperate situations; the receding threshold of "nuclearization" caused by the lost monopoly of intercontinental weapons left a void corresponding to a whole range of "little to moderate gravity" but infinitely more probable; and

--in the technical state of the art in the 1960 decade there is available no method of eliminating with certainty the enemy's destructive missiles; thus any strategy of using nuclear weapons in a first or second strike means suicide for the United States.

Under such conditions the Americans had to mount a strategy minimizing the strategic exchange. At first the consequence was the doctrine of "flexible response." Conflicts in which American territory would not be involved would be at first waged with conventional weapons and later on with strategic nuclear weapons. They would be considered limited conflicts. Simultaneously several doctrines for employment of strategic nuclear weapons saw the light of day: their

principles were the "anti-force strike" of MacNamara and the "selective strike" of Schlesinger. The former would spare the adversary's cities in the hope of reciprocity. Its objectives would be offensive and defensive military resources while retaining the second strike in which the American government still believed. It would therefore precede, and facilitate, carrying out the massive reprisals which might possibly follow. The selective strike would be one limited to several military and economic objectives, not endangering the viability of the enemy country but it would be great enough to prove the determination of the United States and push the enemy to negotiate quickly. The Americans thus expected to delay as much as possible the moment when they would have to attack enemy cities. What is more, the exploitation of these strategies requires weapons systems which are precise and capable of surveying an adverse anti-force strike.

The Soviet reactions to these changes include political aspects flowing from the Marxist-Leninist perception of imperialism and technical and military aspects which reflect the systems elaborated by military science and confirmed by the doctrine. Analysis of the latter is the more interesting because of their tangible consequences for the organization of the Soviet armed forces.

For the Soviets, as for the Americans, abandonment of the strategy of "massive reprisals" is a consequence of the increase in "The Nuclear Capabilities of the USSR."[15] The flexible response is defined in Soviet works on military doctrine as a strategy intended "to wage aggressive limited or local wars by using conventional weapons alone or in combination with nuclear weapons."[16] They distinguish three kinds of factors capable of limiting the war: the political objectives, the types of weapons employed, and the territorial limits.

The Political Objectives

In the American strategy the goals pursued in a limited conflict must be modest enough that escalation by the two protagonists is not justified. The Soviets cannot in any case whatever adhere to this kind of limitation because the objectives could be achieved only at the expense of the socialist forces. They are themselves not committed to any limitations in the defense of their acquisitions. Even though, in the case of the defense of the European socialist bloc this position is clear, in other sectors it can be believed that, in the absence of violent reaction, it is only categorical. Up to now the Soviets have never directly engaged in a conflict in which the Americans had clearly enunciated their political objectives and exploited the military resources appropriate for upholding them. Vietnam is the best example. In this way they have demonstrated to the United States the sound basis of its concept of limitation, but this lack of engagement may also be interpreted as the fear among the Soviets of not being able to control the conflict within the scope of a "limited defeat: This inconsistency reflects the USSR's prudence in foreign engagements, which has certainly led to conception of a strategy by an intermediary, as has been used in Angola, for example. However, such prudence cannot be taken as a general rule if the recent Soviet intervention in Afghanistan is considered. The outcome of that affair will show whether, in view of success in a limited engagement in Afghanistan, Soviet doctrine relating to the subject will be modified or whether, in

the face of an impasse, the leaders in the Kremlin will be confronted with the dilemma of either widening the conflict or accepting a limited defeat, a dilemma which they put forth in their critiques of the American engagement in Vietnam.

Limitation by Kinds of Weapons Employed

A first problem arises, that of a possible conventional conflict. The Soviet doctrine, as a whole, considers that a worldwide conflict will include nuclear armament, that the organization and preparation of forces must be based upon an hypothesis: "In our times the armed forces must be capable, under all circumstances, of thwarting a surprise attack by an aggressor using nuclear weapons as well as conventional ones and, with quick and crushing blows, to defeat his nuclear weapons and troop concentrations, and thus bring together the conditions favorable for later conduct of the war and its victorious end."[17]

The first phase of a conflict with a nuclear power would therefore consist of destruction of its nuclear weapons, whatever the nature of the aggression. However, Soviet military science is studying the possibilities and limitations of conventional combat. In general the conclusions are ambiguous but denote an unwillingness to bend the doctrine on the part of some high level military figures such as Lt Gen Zavialov who wrote in 1970: "The art of military operations with nuclear weapons and the art of military operations with conventional weapons have many fundamental differences. But they are not in opposition to each other, are not mutually exclusive and are not isolated from each other. On the contrary they closely overlap and are developed as a whole."[18]

Nevertheless the same author recognizes the difficulty of the problem: "How to define the plan for a unique operation while considering the separate or simultaneous employment of nuclear and conventional weapons?.. It is indeed necessary to train the troops to carry out operations under all possible circumstances." Therefore from that it cannot be concluded that conventional combat is to be waged in parallel with the utilization of tactical nuclear weapons (ANT [armed nuclear rockets tactiques]) or that it may be contemplated when nuclear weapons are used.

On this problem there has been perceptible evolution in the doctrine also. Thus, in old work, "The Armed Forces of the Soviet Union," published in 1971, Marshal Grechko after having emphasized the improvement of conventional weapons, the increase of their fire power and mobility, contemplates the possibility of assigning to them decisive missions upon the battlefield which they are capable of accomplishing without recourse to nuclear weapons.[19]

What does Grechko mean by battlefield? May that situation be expanded to an entire theater of operations? Nothing is less certain.

A second problem is that of limiting the use of nuclear weapons at the tactical level. The Soviet doctrine's response is clear. The strategic or tactical character can be distinguished neither by the weapon's power nor by the place from which launched. "It does not appear possible to foresee the political,

military, and psychological consequences of using that weapon (ANT). The adversary, as a response to the employment of ANT will be able to launch the same number of nuclear strikes but with a character of more violent reprisal."[10] The Soviet doctrine's conclusions are on the side of the danger of escalation in a conflict in which the ANT would be employed. It may be remarked that this danger is exacerbated by the disparity of the tactical nuclear arsenals of the Warsaw Pact and of NATO. To the use of low power ANT by NATO (nuclear artillery, for example) the Warsaw Pact could respond with its arsenal consisting of weapons of different character, based upon missiles carrying powerful charges (up to several hundred kilotons) and its battlefield nuclear weapons).

The Geographical Limits

The geographical limits are assumed to be the more effective to the extent that, in a limited conflict, they are the more easily defined, observed, and mutually controlled by both sides. This applies in particular to economically underdeveloped regions and to theaters of operations localized upon islands or peninsulas."[11]

Once the geographical limitation is achieved there may be no other upon which the resources are used. So, "it is entirely possible that the aggressor will use nuclear weapons in a localized war...but it is doubtful that such use will immediately lead the war into a worldwide conflict. In any event it is in the interest of the Soviet Union and all of progressive humanity to put an end to the localized war or to limit it, and to defeat the aggressor with limited forces. Solving this problem is one of the important tasks in the development of contemporary military theory."[12]

Then some consequences related to the form of a possible European conflict can be sketched. The limitation to the European "peninsula" would be consistent, on the one hand with the concept of decoupling which appears frequently in the American strategy and which the Soviets can only exploit, and on the other hand, with parity of intercontinental strategic resources of the two superpowers institutionalized in the SALT agreements. The use of tactical or theater (European) nuclear weapons foreseen by the Soviets as well as by NATO, reinforces the hypothesis that a conflict involving all of Europe need not be nuclear. The European (up to now, French and British) strategic nuclear forces, to which would be added the theater forces of the Americans (Pershing 2 and GLCM) would then assume capital importance to the extent that they would be the only ones able and willing to extend the theater of operations to the western part of the Soviet Union. The use of theater nuclear weapons of American origin would in no way imply commitment of American central systems. Without prejudging the political will to assure uncoupling of European defense from defense of their own territory, the new Pershing 2 and GLCM weapons will thus constitute an additional component of the American military arsenal which would enable the United States to avoid being irretrievably carried into an intercontinental confrontation. The initiative for escalating the European conflict into an intercontinental conflict would rest in the hands of the Soviet Union which would not fail to make highly deterrent use of it in order to complete American decoupling.

The Soviet political leaders consider the new American doctrines relating to strategic nuclear strikes ambiguous. Thus, the efforts at armament linked to adoption of an anti-force strike are regarded "as an attempt to acquire decisive superiority over the Soviet Union in the area of strategic nuclear armament."[23] American intention of adhering to a response strike is indeed doubted. The "selective strike" doctrine is said to have a demagogic purpose. It would make "the prospect of a nuclear conflict more acceptable and by itself justify plans for increasing nuclear power."[24] The Soviets next emphasize the influence of "reactionary circles" which have an interest in strengthening military capabilities and influence the policy of detente.

The opinions of the Soviet military theoreticians are more significant than these political reactions. At the time of the first deployments of Soviet intercontinental weapons the anti-force strike was seen as a priority strike. One of the conditions necessary for gaining victory in the nuclear war was destruction of adverse strategic systems, in particular the ICBM in their silos, but in no case must the initial nuclear battle be reduced to an anti-force exchange. At the same time other aspects of military power would be targeted. (armaments industry, troop concentrations) as well as vital economic centers and the centers of military and civil decision. But, "in a war against an enemy possessing immense territory enabling him to use space and time to organize a passive or active defense, maneuver his forces, and mobilize his reserves, an attack with nuclear rockets alone is not enough to achieve victory against such an enemy."[25]

The Soviet theoreticians see, in the strategy of limited exchanges, military science heresy. They attribute to the Americans the intention of fighting with nuclear weapons in accordance with the methods derived from conventional combat. This attitude, to them, is contrary to the objective laws of modern war: "...a nuclear war can assume unlimited scope much more rapidly than a war in which only conventional weapons are employed."[26] Moreover, "the possibilities (for the political leaders) to maneuver, to manage weapons in a nuclear war have decreased."[27] For them, elaboration of the doctrine of limited exchange has an intentional subjective aspect." "The attempts to eliminate the line of demarcation between nuclear and conventional weapons by limitation of strategic strikes, as well as efforts to miniaturize the ANT, are intended to create a psychological tolerance for the prospect of a nuclear war."[28]

Last, the Soviet doctrine never considers that selectivity and limitation of the intensity of a nuclear strike constitute options serving their objectives. The basic principle remains seeking [striking] power: "The Communist Party of the Soviet Union considers it essential to maintain the defense of the Soviet Union and combat readiness of the armed forces at a level which will assure the decisive and total defeat of any enemy who would dare attack the Soviet fatherland."[29]

From this it can be concluded that during the course of the last 15 years the Soviet military doctrine appears relatively unchanged. That stability is demonstrated by the persistence of the idea that total nuclear war has not effaced the concept of victory, thus leaving in the air uncertainty over the determination to unleash or avoid generalized nuclear confrontation. Faced with a changeable American strategy, the Soviet doctrine is adapting to the combat conditions

proposed by the adversary when it sees an obvious advantage there. Thus, it would exploit the decoupling of the American and European strategies. On the other hand, an analysis which endeavors to be scientific prudently rejects proposals to limit the conflict when they are capable of resulting in a compromise that would be contrary to the profound objectives of Marxism-Leninism. It rejects concepts of limiting political objectives, limiting combat to conventional forms, and of selective nuclear strikes.

IV. French Deterrence

The political foundation of French defense policy is nonalinement with the superpowers. This attitude reflects the constancy throughout history of French desire for independence and results from a situation in the present state of affairs specific to defense: American nuclear power can no longer be an effective shield for Europe when American territory is under Soviet fire.

The French defense policy is based upon deterrence whose instrument is a quantitatively limited nuclear striking force. French deterrence consists of posing a threat against an aggressor who may wish to transgress the limits which guarantee vital French political interests. Once these limits have been crossed, carrying out this threat is no longer an integral part of deterrence but on the contrary denotes its failure.

The two main problems of the French strategy are the credibility of the threat, or rather, how the adversary perceives it, and definition of the threshold of "nuclearization," the two being linked. The size and make-up of the French nuclear force is based upon the principle that the enemy will not risk undertaking an action in which he would be assured that the damage he will suffer outweighs the advantages he would derive from it. The size of that force is therefore independent of the nature and power of the analogous enemy forces. It meets a criterion different from that which is met by the American strategy of "mutually assured destruction" which applies to the physical destruction of the adversary's society. The French thesis is based upon cost effectiveness. Certainly, the Soviets are not adventurers and this sort of criterion enters into their strategic reasoning: "The principal criterion of effectiveness which must be integrated into the calculations for a strategic decision is the proportion of the damage inflicted upon the enemy country's economic political, and military potentials and the various ways in which available forces and equipment may be used. However, taking into consideration the bilateral character of armed conflict, this criterion alone is insufficient for reaching a total and optimum decision since the enemy will assign a similar objective to his armed forces. In order to win the war we must use a portion of our forces and equipment to repulse, and cause failure of enemy actions intended to inflict damage upon our country. In this direction the calculations must take a second criterion into consideration, that is, reducing our losses to a minimum."[7]

The results of cost effectiveness calculations, however, run the risk of being different, depending upon whether the "France" stake is being considered, as in the French doctrine, or the "Europe" stake which the Soviet Union is obliged to take into account. The value of the multiplying coefficient which must be

applied to the "France" stake to obtain the Soviet's cost effectiveness results is difficult to assess. Also, increase in the power of the French nuclear force, far from being useless, can only increase its importance in the eyes of the Soviets, so sensitive to the concept of power, in which alone they have confidence: "One of the basic principles is to assure quantitative and qualitative military-technical superiority over the probable aggressor."[31]

The "nuclearization" threshold has undergone notable evolutions since the premise of the Strategic Nuclear Force [FNS: Force Nucleaire Strategique]. At its beginnings the concept of the "national sanctuary" inspired by General Gallois prevailed. Strategic action must be undertaken immediately as soon as there was aggression against the national territory.

That doctrine was opposed to any participation of French nuclear forces in defense of Europe and as an end result rejected any form of European alliance. Unless France were to adopt a policy of extreme isolationism that sanctuary status cannot pass for a gurantee of safety for, if one refers to the Soviet doctrine, the countries "upon whose territory military bases of the United States, NATO, and other military blocs are installed, as well as the countries which establish such bases with aggressive objectives would be subject to crushing attacks in such a war."[32]

The "nuclearization" threshold materialized in the present French doctrine with the introduction of the tactical nuclear weapon. Their use will signify to the adversary that France is determined to launch a strategic nuclear response against the enemy's territory if he does not stop. The tactical nuclear weapon is indeed a significant weapon. At the same time there appeared the possibility of widening the "sanctuary" or, more precisely, of incorporating European interests into the French defense policy. By employing the tactical nuclear weapons forward from its national frontiers France could indicate its strategic intention before its own territory was threatened. But then the signification of crossing the tactical nuclear threshold risks being quickly effaced by both the Soviets and NATO who are incorporationg use of the tactical nuclear weapon into their European strategies. Because of this the French tactical nuclear weapon would become a battlefield weapon completely uncoupled from the strategic forces. This uncoupling, if indeed it is desired by France, would be in contradiction to the Soviet doctrine which accepts only natural territorial limitations for a conflict. If the Soviet logic is followed to the end France would be swallowed up in the theater of operation and subject to nuclear attacks whose objectives are the military forces around the nuclear strategic forces, its civil and military decision centers, and its industrial potential.

Finally, the problem of French defense policy is somewhat similar to the American problem. It consists of defining the modes of its participation in European defense. But, although the United States can theoretically completely dissociate itself, France cannot do so because of its geographical location. The Soviet doctrine is formulated too generally for one to be able to draw clear conclusions from it, but it is certain that it cannot isolate the French case in the analysis of European security. One may take cognizance of that in the invitations extended to France to participate in a SALT II negotiation upon armaments in the "gray"

areas. The French analyst can only hope that in the next few years the Soviet efforts in this direction will let the actual perception of the strategic nuclear forces by the USSR be glimpsed.

General Conclusion

The Soviet military strategy is profoundly influenced by Marxist-Leninist ideas on the essentials of war and it is significant to observe that the advent of the nuclear weapon has not thrown into question the grand principles of that reflection.

War remains the extension of policy by other means, either when that policy is aggressive or when it has exhausted "peaceful" means for attaining its ends. Nuclear war can still serve aggressive designs but the kind of war is a less flexible instrument than in the past, considering the universal character it would take on and its degree of violence. An error of judgment would have irremediable consequences. As the destructive power of the protagonists increases, their margin of maneuverability is restricted.

The political authority, by the objectives it sets, assigns direction to the preparation for armed conflict. This principle emphasizes the consistency which must exist between the political intentions and the elaboration of the military strategy and implies that the latter is only one facet of an overall policy. Direction indeed is in the hands of the political authority for it must make certain that the objectives of the armed combat remain consistent with its own. This aspect was reinforced with the advent of nuclear weapons because of the rapidity with which military actions spread in time of crisis, then of war.

War constitutes a means of changing political situations by imposing the policy of the victor. This principle was discussed and then forcefully reaffirmed and constitutes the fundamental principle of Soviet military doctrine since it defines the victory for which it must prepared: the annihilation of adverse political systems and their replacement by the socialist system.

In the viewpoint from these principles the West's nuclear doctrines form a part of aggressive policies which, to the Soviets, characterize imperialism. The doctrines of nuclear deterrence demonstrate the efforts to increase the role of weapons in peacetime and therefore cause policy to be based upon "a position of strength." To face this the Soviets consider the only method is to increase the power of the socialist camp, particularly its armed forces, thrusting back upon the West the responsibility for the arms race. In the doctrines resulting from the concept of flexible response they see efforts to increase the margin of maneuver, which enables them to present the Soviet Union in the image of a power anxious to maintain peace.

The principle relating to the concept of victory is in complete contradiction of the "peaceful" doctrines which see, in nuclear weapons, a negation of the state of war and by virtue of that a guarantee of peace, and of the "suicidal" policies which consider any effort at civil defense as a destabilization.

From the principle there follows what is considered wrongly as an ambiguity in Soviet intentions. On the one hand the political authority cautions against the dangers of nuclear war and asserts that the usefulness of war as a political instrument is reduced by the inherent characteristics of nuclear weapons, and on the other hand, it presses the population and the armed forces to be prepared for total war waged on to victory and denoting the disappearance of the enemy's social system. However, the Soviets shade this ambiguity by qualifying their offensive military strategy--qualifying it as the opposite of the aggressive.

Although the principles present in the elaboration of the military strategy appear clearly in the Soviet literature, in contrast the criteria taken into account in strategic decisions and the modes of putting it into operation remain obviously fuzzy. It has also been seen that the same is true for behavior in a local or limited conflict. Analysis in this area must rely upon bases other than doctrinal writings if it is desired to end up with hypothesis on the behavior in a flict which is necessarily plausible in signification. As a matter of fact such signification is absent, by definition, from the doctrine which permits no choice.

FOOTNOTES

1. Rear Admiral Sevaistre, "Deterrence: Theory or Fact"; DEFENSE NATIONALE, August-September 1980 and Georges Outrey, "The Strategic Doctrines of the Two Superpowers"; ibid., February 1980.

2. Military science deals with knowledge of warfare, including its character, its laws, military organization, preparation of the armed forces and the country for war, and so forth. Like any science it presents results which are widely divergent and may contradict each other. The exposition of conflicting theses is permitted, and in some cases encouraged since, in contrast with military doctrine, only their authors are engaged.

3. G. T. Zavivion, "Soviet Military Science: Its Role and Social Function"; KOMMUNIST VOORUZENYH SIL, No 17, 1972.

4. KOMMUNIST, No 4, 1955.

5. N. Talenskij, "Reflections Upon the Last War"; LA VIE INTERNATIONALE, No 5, 1965.

6. E. Rybkin, "On the Essentials of the Nuclear World War"; KOMMUNIST VOORUZENYH SIL, September 1965.

7. E. Rybkin, op. cit.

8. E. Rybkin, op. cit.

9. A. Gretchko, "For Maintaining Peace and Building Communism"; MOSCOU, 1971, p 64.

10. B. Byely, "Marxism-Leninism, War, and the Armed Forces"; U.S. Air Force translation, 1974, p 217.

11. Protivo vozdusenaja oborona: the air defense forces constitute an armed force of the same category as the ground forces, the navy, and the air force...550,000 men strong. It is equipped with 3,000 interceptors and 12,000 anti-aircraft missiles spread over some 1,650 sites.

12. According to the 1969 Soviet civil defense manual the population losses could be limited to 5-8 percent by evacuation and dispersion.

13. A. Milovidov, "The Political Heritage of V. I. Lenin and the Problems of Contemporary War"; MOSCOU, 1972, p 351.

14. MAD.

15. A. Gretchko, The Armed Forces of the Soviet Union"; USAF translation, 1975, p 276.

16. N. Lomov, "Scientific and Technical Progress, and the Revolution in Military Affairs"; USAF translation, 1973, p 254.

17. A. Gretchko, "For Maintaining Peace and Building Communism"; op.cit.

18. C. Zavealov, "New Weapons and Military Art"; L'ETOILE ROUGE, 30 October 1970.

19. This reasoning of western origin is adopted by the Soviets in "Military Strategy" by Sokolovski, USAF translation, 1968, p 69.

20. V. Sokolovski, op. cit. p 411. This concept of geographical limitation is a very old one among the British, for example in Corbett's book "Some Principles of Maritime Strategy" published in 1911.

21. E. Rybkin, Review of the book "On Peace and War"; VOJENNAJA MYSL., No 7, 1966.

22. GLCM: Ground launched cruise missile.

23. L. Semeyko, "New Forces, Same Substance"; L'ETOILE ROUGE, 8 April 1975.

24. L. Semeyko, op. cit.

25. V. Kulakov, "The Problems of Military-Technical Superiority"; VOJENNAJA MYSL., No 1, 1964.

26. L. Semeyko, op. cit.

27. E. Rybkin, "On the Essentials of the Nuclear World War"; op. cit.

28. L. Semeyko, op. cit.

29. A. Melovidov, op. cit., p 88.

30. V. Prokhorov, "Principles of Troop Control in Light of Cybernetic Requirements"; TOENNAJA MYSL., No 5, 1968.

31. A. Gretchko, "For Maintaining Peace and Building Communism"; op. cit.

32. A. Gretchko, "For Maintaining Peace and Building Communism"; op. cit.

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